

## **WEEK 5**

# **IDEAS AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN NATIONAL PREFERENCE FORMATION**

**Alexander Wendt, Social Theory and International Politics**  
(Cambridge, Cambridge UP 1999), Chs 1 (partial), 3, 4,6

**Chapter 1 Four sociologies of international politics**

In his first chapter, Wendt proposes a “map of structural theorizing”: he interprets different forms of structural IR theory in the light of two debates in social theory.

- On the x-axis, “the difference *ideas* make” in social life: this is the extent to which ideas are material (a “**materialist**” sociology) or social (“**idealist**”).
- On the y-axis, “the difference *structures* make”: this is the relationship between agents (“**individualist**”) and structure (“**holist**”).

**MATERIALIST hypothesis:** material forces (human nature, natural resources, geography, forces of production, forces of destruction) *as such* drive social forms (23-4). It privileges **causal** relationships, effects, questions etc.

**IDEALIST:** deep structure of society is constituted by ideas rather than material forces. It privileges **constitutive** relations, effects, questions etc. (25)

For the agent-structure problem, Wendt looks at the question of the extent to which structures “construct” agents. He makes the distinction between the “effects of structures on agents’ *properties*” (ie constructing effects) and “effects on agents’ *behavior*” (ie constraining)

**HOLIST:** a “top-down” conception of social life, which is irreducible; agents’ properties are constructed in both causal and constitutive senses.

**INDIVIDUALISM:** a “bottom-up” conception of social life, which is reducible to agents; agents’ behavior can only be constrained by causal effects.

His book comes into the “idealist-holist” box which he describes as constructivist.

Wendt then cites what he perceives to be his methodological, ontological and empirical differences before finally making two claims:

1. “What really matters is what there is rather than how we know it.”
2. “Science should be question rather than method-driven, and the importance of constitutive questions creates an essential role in social science for interpretive methods”. (40)

**Chapter 3: “Ideas all the way down?”: on the constitution of power and interest**

This chapter shows that much of the apparent explanatory power of ostensibly “materialist” explanations is actually constituted by suppressed assumptions about the content and distribution of ideas.

The *realist and neorealist* approaches of IR are too exclusively focused on power (understood ultimately as military capability) and interest (egoistic desire for power, security, or wealth), and, to a lesser extent, international institutions. They do not recognize the difference ideas make. But *idealism* is also flawed, because it makes the same mistake of treating materialist factors and ideas separately, simply putting more emphasis on ideas. It cannot be ideas all the way down because ideas are based on and are regulated by an independently existing physical reality.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, both approaches fail to recognize that ideas make a difference mainly *through* power and interest, and that, in turn, the explanatory power of power and interest (materialist) factors is largely explained by the role of ideas, whereas “brute” material forces, that is, things which exist and have certain causal power independent of ideas have a very limited explanatory power.

Wendt proposes a *social constructivist* approach, which focuses on the extent to which ideas *constitute* the ostensibly “material” causes in the first place. This does not mean that ideas are more important than power and interest, which remain as important as they were, but that **power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up**. The meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas:

1. The meaning of the distribution of power in international politics is constituted in important part by the distribution of interests.
2. The content of interests are in turn constituted in important part by ideas (which have a constitutive role, *not* a causal one).<sup>2</sup>

“The constitutive debate between materialists and idealists is not about the relative contribution of ideas versus power and interest to social life. The debate is about the relative contribution of brute material forces to power and interest explanations. Materialist cannot claim power and interest as “their” variables; it all depends on how the latter are constituted”.

Materialist explanations acquire their causal powers only in virtue of the *contexts of meaning* which make them what they are. Therefore, much of the apparent explanatory power of ostensibly “materialist” explanations is actually constituted by suppressed

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<sup>1</sup> “Brute material forces” (military resources, technology, geography and natural resources, etc.) have independent effects on international life, mainly by defining for all actors the outer limits of feasible activity and the relative cost of pursuing various options that require physical activity. One could consider that material constraints can be eliminated over time by human intervention, so that in the long run it is ideas all the way down. BUT since the extent to which material constraints can be overcome is not clear, and since in the short run material constraints are not negotiable, brute material forces have some irreducible explanatory power.

<sup>2</sup> Ideas at the macro level of the international system get into the heads of states and become interests at this other, more micro level of international structure. Later on in the book, he argues that these interest-constituting ideas are in turn constituted by the *shared* ideas of the international system.

constructivist assumptions about the content and distribution of ideas. This is the case with Waltz' materialist theory of structure, which rests on implicit assumptions about the distribution of interests –and confuses materiality and objectivity.<sup>3</sup> This is why Wendt tries to reduce “materialism” to a rump definition focusing on materiality per se (cf. footnote 1): this gives a firm ground to the study of the impact of interests.

Since power and interest explanations presuppose ideas, ideas on the one hand and power and interest on the other should not be considered as rival causes. Wendt refuses to be caught in the either/or dilemma between idealism and materialism. “Material” explanations should be complemented by inquiries into the discursive conditions which make them work:

“when Neorealists offer multipolarity as an explanation for war, inquire into the discursive conditions that constitute the poles as enemies rather than friends. When Liberals offer economic interdependence as an explanation for peace, inquire into the discursive conditions that constitute states with identities that care about free trade and economic growth. And so on

Consequently, the “distribution of ideas” in the system is the most fundamental factor in IR, and understanding how this distribution operates should be the core of scholars' inquiries.<sup>4</sup>

Against rational choice theorists, Wendt argues that only a small part of what constitutes interest is actually material. The core of rationalist explanations is the view that preferences and expectations generate behavior: “desire plus belief equals action”. Moreover, rationalists think that desire (or preference or interest) and belief (or expectations or ideas) as distinct variables, which suggest that desires do not depend on beliefs and are therefore material. (finally, they usually do not ask where interests come from). Wendt's argument<sup>5</sup> is that desire is not separate from belief but constituted by it. Desire (interest) indeed has both a cognitive and a deliberative basis: interests are themselves cognitions or ideas, and they are the result of an internal deliberation (which implies that reason is added to the model: desire plus belief plus reason equals action). In short: **“interests are beliefs about how to meet needs”**.

But this leaves open the question of what needs are about. Wendt claims there are 2 kinds of needs: identity needs (which reflect the internal and external structures that constitute the actors as social kinds – and cannot be easily theorized) and material needs, which can be derived from “human nature”. Wendt then exposes a “rump materialist “theory” of human nature”, listing 5 kinds of material needs: physical security, ontological security

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<sup>3</sup> “Waltz has made an assumption about the distribution of interests in the system as a whole, and in so doing he has added to his theory of structure two things which he says do not belong there: non-capability attributes (egoistic motivations), and the quality of relations among units (self-help). In other words, he has made an assumption about the *social* structure of international politics. This does not make his theory of structure wrong, just underspecified.

<sup>4</sup> Wendt claims that this approach avoids the trap in which Neorealists are caught by arguing that ideas have a causal impact. It is indeed incoherent, says Wendt, to claim that ideas are relatively autonomous while affirming that the material base remains still determinant in the last instance.

<sup>5</sup> Backed by “a growing body of scholarship in philosophy, cognitive psychology, anthropology, and even economics”!

(need for stable expectations), sociation (need for contacts), self-esteem, and transcendence (need for development and improvement of one's life conditions). Wendt points out that even if they are debatable, such theories are actually needed to explain human behavior –and for instance how interests are constituted, and that the introduction of “biological realism” does not rule out the importance of social construction.

The point of such an idealist approach to the study of interests in IR is threefold:

- It emphasizes the need for empirical research studying the content of real world state interests
- It suggests ways to operationalize the relationship between cognition (agency) and culture (structure)
- It suggests new possibilities for foreign policy and systemic change. If, on the one hand, the self-fulfilling character of culture makes it difficult to change interests and beliefs, on the other hand it nonetheless opens the door for change through discursive processes of deliberation, learning, and negotiation.

Wendt finally formulates his view as follows: How agents perceive the world is important in explaining their actions, and they always have an element of choice in defining their identities and interests. However, holism or structuralism, which holds that social structures have effects that *cannot* be reduced to agents and their interactions, tempers or complements this idealist view. Among the effects of structures is the shaping of identities and interests, which are conditioned by discursive formations –by the distribution of ideas in the system- as well as by material forces, and as such are not formed in a vacuum.

Chapter 4 addresses the effects of the distribution of ideas in the system, and the sense in which it might be structured.

#### Chapter 4: Structure, agency, and culture

Social constructivism is about both idealism and structuralism. Structuralism means that “structures” have effects not reducible to agents. Wendt identifies three such kinds of structures: material structure, structure of interests, ideational structure, all being articulated and equally necessary to explain social outcomes. “Without ideas there are no interests, without interests there are no meaningful material conditions, without material conditions there is no reality at all”. Therefore, it is best to think of the social system as a singular structure. But how about the relative weight of each component of this structure?

The key is to understand how interests work. Materialists privilege material conditions, and try to show that they largely determine interests. Idealists privilege ideas, and try to show that they largely determine interests. To overcome this opposition, Wendt focuses on the ways in which distributions of ideas may be structured and relates to interests.

To address the complexity of cultural structures, in both their nature and their effects, Wendt sets up a typology based on three distinctions:

- (1) between the two **levels** on which they are organized, micro and macro, manifested as common and collective knowledge respectively. Common knowledge is a concept of game theory, which provides a useful model of how culture is structured at the micro-level. Common knowledge concerns actors' beliefs, about each other's rationality, strategies, preferences and beliefs, as well as about states of the external world. Specific cultural forms like norms, rules, institutions, conventions, ideologies, customs and laws are all made of common knowledge. Common knowledge is nothing but beliefs in heads, nothing but shared mental models. But constructivism adds to this an emphasis on the constitutive aspect of culture, at the macro level, through Durkheim's idea of collective representations or knowledge. These are knowledge structures held by groups which generate macro-level patterns in individual behavior over time. In t
- (2) between their causal and their –often neglected- constitutive **effects**. Causal effects describe a change in the state of Y as a result of a change in the state of an independently existing X. Constitutive effects describe how the properties of an X make a Y what it is. These differences are reflected in the terms appropriate to characterizing the relationship between agency and structure. The former is a relationship of interaction or co-determination, the latter of conceptual dependence, or mutual constitution.
- (3) between their effects **on** behavior and on identities and interests

Wendt's approach gives equal weight to agency and structure, which are *mutually* constitutive and co-determined: structure exists, has effects, and evolves only because of agents and their practices. This means that the dependence of structure on agency and the social process is both constitutive and causal. In a both causal and constitutive sense, structure is an on-going effect of process, at the same time that process is an effect of structure (!). Wendt captures the two effects in the idea that culture is a self-fulfilling prophecy: culture tends to reproduce itself, and must do so if it is to be culture. The reason why culture reproduces itself is that socially shared knowledge plays a key role in making interaction relatively predictable over time, generating homeostatic tendencies that stabilize social order.

But a lot remains to be done to clarify the ways in which cultural structures affects international politics.

### **Chapter 6: Three Cultures of Anarchy**

Wendt considers two questions:

- 1) Variation question: Is anarchy compatible with more than one structure/logic?  
Answer: Despite the Neorealist view of the matter, anarchy can have at least three kinds of structure, depending on the types of roles that dominate the system, such as those of enemy, rival, and friend. These correspond to three types of structure: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.
- 2) Construction question: Does the international system construct states?  
Answer: Despite the Rationalist view, Wendt argues the holist hypothesis that the structure of the international system has construction effects on states: i.e., it affects identities and interests, not just the behavior of states.

According to Wendt, emphasis is usually placed exclusively either on the elements of the international system or on the “anarchic structures [sic]” that give rise to these elements. He chooses the middle road, and argues that structures do give rise to the elements of the international system, but structures vary, and can therefore produce multiple logics. The concept of international anarchy thus becomes meaningless, without the ingredients that make it up. This gives him the best of both worlds, since he resorts to Liberalism’s emphasis on domestic politics *within* a structural approach to the international system. The key to this approach lies in conceptualizing structure in social (in the Weberian sense), rather than in material terms. Thus, to provide a full answer to the construction question, he proposes to examine three reasons why actors observe cultural norms: i) coercion, ii) self-interest, iii) legitimacy of norms. In doing so, Wendt draws attention to two assumptions regarding the international system that stem from his approach to structural theorizing: 1) that there is no relationship between the extent of shared ideas or culture and cooperation, and 2) that roles are not the properties of agents, but of the structures.

**Hobbesian Culture: Other = Enemy.** The exercise of violence is without limits (i.e. includes death). Mistrust among actors. War of all against all (“kill or be killed”).

Compliance: occurs through coercion, since there is no trust. Also through what is perceived as self interest, while benefits outweigh costs. Despite desire to destroy enemy, “states do not have enough power to ‘kill’ each other”. Thus the actors that are necessary to the very existence of this scheme are sustained, and enmity is seen as necessary and legitimate.

**Lockean Culture: Other = Rival.** The exercise of violence is limited by an acceptance of the other actors’ right to live (“kill or be killed” of Hobbesian Culture replaced by “live and let live”). Sovereignty is thus recognized not only as “a property of individual states, but an *institution* shared by many states”. Wendt finds that the Hobbesian model fails to describe the world, since the death rate of states is very low, and that this model comes closer. In fact, he uses the Lockean model to rescue Waltz, whose theory he sees as such.

Compliance: States can be coerced by stronger states, and accept the institution of sovereignty, as it is in their interest to do so. Be this as it may, sovereignty is also accepted for its own sake, and is internalized as a norm. The distinction between the second and third (self-interest, legitimacy) is difficult to determine, but nevertheless legitimate, as far as Wendt is concerned.

**Kantian Culture: Other = Friend.** Disputes are settled without recourse to violence, and common action is possible.

Compliance: Actors are coerced into not attacking one another, but also into cooperating in the face of common threats. It is possible to concentrate on what is to be gained from friendship, so as to weigh the relationship on the basis of self-interest. Bonds of friendship alert actors as to the interconnectedness of particular interests, which leads to an appreciation of friendship as a norm, legitimate in its own right.

Wendt claims that this spectrum is not meant as a progression from the Hobbesian to the Kantian. On the other hand, he is also unwilling to share what he identifies as Realist pessimism regarding the possibility of progress in international politics (as indicated by his next project, on “why a world state is inevitable”). He is willing, however, to argue that it is unlikely that international politics will move backwards (which implies that it has moved forward).

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***John Gerard Ruggie, "International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,"***

*International Organization* 36, no. 2 (Spring 1982), pp. 379-415.

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Ruggie makes a three-pronged argument:

- a) Political authority is a "fusion of power with legitimate social purpose." (p.382) Traditional IR theories ignore the dimension of social purpose,<sup>6</sup> a sine qua non to explaining the *content* next to the *form* of the international order.
- b) International economic regimes<sup>7</sup> "play a mediating role, by providing a permissive environment for the emergence of certain kinds of transactions, specifically transactions that are perceived to be complementary to the normative frameworks of the regimes having a bearing on them." (p. 404)
- c) Power and purpose do not necessarily covary, broadening the dimensions of sources of change. Ruggie focuses particularly on "norm-governed" change (p. 405), where in spite of hegemonic decline one may still find continuity in the normative frameworks (principles and norms) of regimes, while new instrumentalities (rules and procedures) reflect the new power distribution. He argues that post-1971 economic regime developments in money and trade are best characterized as and explained by norm-governed changes.

More specifically:

1. Pre-WWI orthodox liberalism was displaced during the interwar period by a new balance between "markets" and "authority," whereby governments assumed a greater role in ensuring domestic social and economic stability. Comparing the pre-WWI and interwar gold standard systems, Ruggie argues that the interwar system failed not because of the lack of a hegemon, but because the gold standard regime stood in contradiction to the new mediating role of the state between market and society.
2. Ruggie terms this as the "compromise of embedded liberalism," (p. 393) whereby governments could use Keynesian domestic growth policies while maintaining monetary stability through international cooperation (e.g., the double screen of the IMF to correct "fundamental disequilibri[a]"). "Unlike the economic nationalism of the thirties, [embedded liberalism] would be multilateral in character; unlike the liberalism of the gold standard and free trade, its multilateralism would be predicated upon domestic interventionism." (p. 393)
3. Postwar transaction flows contradict a pure Ricardian hypothesis of liberalization, and are better explained by embedded liberalism, whereby the international division of labor approximates comparative advantage but also minimizes domestic social disruption. For example, the post-1971 dominance of

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<sup>6</sup> In particular, Ruggie takes hegemonic stability theories (e.g., Kindleberger) as his baseline for comparison.

<sup>7</sup> Ruggie uses the definition of international regimes as "social institutions around which actor expectations converge in a given area of international relations." (p. 380)



intracontinental and intrasectoral trade (the "narrowing of the economic basis" of international transactions) minimized domestic adjustment costs of trade liberalization via GATT negotiations. Ruggie argues that international economic regimes do not determine international economic transactions, but play a mediating role (see (b) above).

4. The hypothesis of norm-governed change provides a better explanation for the commencement of a floating rate exchange rate regime and the "new protectionism" of nontariff barriers, domestic safeguards, and voluntary export restraints. In other words, changes in money and trade have been at the instrument rather than the norm level. Hegemonic decline, hence, is not necessarily destabilizing when social purpose remains the same.
5. Embedded liberalism has facilitated three modes of externalization of adjustment costs, which may threaten the long-term stability of embedded liberalism: intertemporal (i.e., inflation), intersectoral (i.e., shifting responsibility from public institutions to market actors, such as the increased role of international financial markets in balance-of-payments lending), and terstratum (i.e., shifting adjustment costs onto "regime takers," generally LDCs).

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***Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane: "Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytical Framework"***,

in Goldstein and Keohane, eds., *Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Cornell UP, 1993), pp. 3-30

Thesis: ideas influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships, when they affect outcomes of strategic situations in which there is no unique equilibrium, and when they become embedded in political institutions.

NOT arguing that ideas matter INSTEAD of interests, but rather than both have causal weight in explanation of human actions

Liberal institutionalism and realism view interests as logically prior to ideas. Both assumes that constraints on actions are key, not ideas; purpose of article is to show that even if rationality is true, ideas help coordinate individual behavior.

Null hypothesis: variation in policy across countries, or over time, is entirely accounted for by changes in factors other than ideas.

Different from psychological approaches because it does not focus on the interpretation of reality but on the impact of particular beliefs about the nature of worlds that have implications for human action. They do not seek to explain the sources of ideas, but to focus on their effects.

3 types of beliefs:

1. world views: conceptions of possibility, embedded in the symbolism of a culture; entwined with people's conceptions of their identities, evoking deep emotions and loyalties; religion and science promote world views.
2. principled beliefs: normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust; often justified in terms of world views, but world views are so expansive they can encompass contradictory beliefs
3. causal beliefs: beliefs about cause-effect relationship which derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites; they provide guides for individuals on how to achieve their objectives.

3 causal pathways through which ideas can impact policy outcomes:

1. ideas serve as road maps; once an idea is accepted it limits choice by logically excluding other interpretations of reality
2. ideas contribute to outcomes in the absence of a unique equilibrium: ideas serve as focal points that define cooperative solutions or facilitate group cohesion
3. ideas embedded in institutions specify policy in the absence of innovation: once a policy choice -> structures, that idea can affect the incentives of political actors long after interests have changed

key question is the extent to which variation in beliefs, or the manner in which ideas are institutionalized in societies, affect political action under circumstances that are otherwise similar.

Method for research:

1. evidentiary inference: making inferences about what happened and attaching probabilities to inferences
2. descriptive inference: 2 components- 1. distinction between random and systematic aspects of behavior 2. assessment of the extent to which self-reported and observed behavior reflect beliefs; think in terms of counterfactuals

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**Bear Braumoeller, "Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic Peace in the Soviet Successor States,"**

*International Studies Quarterly* (1997) 41, 375-402.

- I. The goal of the article is to test whether the underlying assumptions about the attitudes of elites and masses in the democratic peace literature are applicable to the Soviet successor states. The central argument is that these assumptions will not apply in key ways. Liberalism is not monolithic, as the democratic peace literature assumes, and certain forms of liberalism seem unlikely to be peaceful. In particular, the bellicose nature of the liberal nationalism associated with the Soviet successor states suggests that the spread of liberalism could actually promote more than inhibit conflict. The article tests a range of hypotheses concerning the applicability of democratic peace assumptions to the former Soviet Union using survey data from Russia and Ukraine in the mid-1990s.
- II. Assessing two traditional explanations of the democratic peace:
- A. Democratic structures arguments -- leaders of democratic countries are constrained by public opinion; moreover, leaders of democratic states are aware of each other's constraints and thus have little reason to fear each other. If this is true, we would expect to find that:
1. Leaders perceive foreign relations as more conflictual than citizens do. (H1)
  2. Leaders are more likely than citizens to advocate the use of force. (H2)
- B. Democratic norms arguments -- liberalism gives rise to mutual respect and beliefs in both autonomy and freedom from foreign intervention; democracies recognize other democracies as sharing these norms, resulting in peace between them. If this is true, we would expect that:
1. Individuals who are liberals and who perceive another country to be democratic will perceive less conflict with that country than would otherwise be the case. (H3)
  2. Liberals are less likely than illiberals to advocate the use of force to solve conflicts. (H4a)
- III. Liberal Nationalism -- liberalism and nationalism became intertwined in the national liberation movements that developed in non-Russian Soviet republics. Liberals in such circumstances were faced with a hard choice between abandoning their pacifist preferences on the one hand and continued national subjugation on the other. The former was typically chosen, resulting in "national fronts" that conflated liberal principles of domestic governance with violent nationalism. If this liberal nationalism is genuinely "liberal" in terms of attitudes toward domestic governance, but linked to nationalism and thus more outwardly bellicose than other forms of liberalism, we would expect to find that:
1. Liberals in Ukraine are more likely than illiberals to advocate the use of force to resolve conflicts, especially those involving Ukraine and Ukrainians. (H4b)
  2. Liberals should identify themselves with nationalists in Ukraine but not in Russia (see note below). (H5)
  3. Liberals in Ukraine should express inclusivist concepts of citizenship. (H6)

Note: Liberal nationalism does not apply to Russia since Russian liberals and nationalists were polarized, not united, by the dissolution of the USSR. Among other things, Russian liberals support for greater self-determination alienated Russian nationalists who opposed importing a political system from Cold War adversaries.

#### IV. Results

- A. There was significant evidence for the structural constraints perspective. Russian decisionmakers had a more conflictual view of Russia's relations with other countries than Russian citizens did, confirming H1. (This finding was significant but not "robust," i.e. it did not hold consistently across different countries.) Russian leaders were also more supportive of the use of force, though the evidence was not as strong here (H2). In general, the evidence for the structural argument was strongest when the decisionmakers were political and military elites, and weaker when other elite groups had influence over foreign policy.
- B. The democratic norms perspective was strongly supported in one sense, but not well supported in another. Hypothesis H3 was strongly supported by the data -- liberals in Russia and Ukraine who saw another country as liberal were more likely to view relations with that country in a positive light. As for liberal attitudes on the use of force, there was mild support for H4a in Russia, i.e. liberals were less supportive of the use of force. In Ukraine, however, liberals were often more likely than illiberals to advocate the use of force.
- C. The liberal nationalism perspective received significant support. Increasing liberalism of respondents in Ukraine was associated with greater willingness to use force both in defense of Ukrainians and elsewhere (H4b), as well as with greater nationalism (H5). (In Russia, increasing liberalism was associated with a decreasing measure of nationalism as expected.) And Ukrainian liberals were more likely to define citizenship in an inclusivist fashion (H6).

IV. Conclusion: The democratic peace is not applicable in a simple way to the former Soviet Union. The results suggested that peace in the region would be "sustainable... but especially vulnerable to national issues and to the effects of narrow political institutions, both on foreign policy and on foreign perceptions." National issues will be particularly provocative given the character of liberal nationalism that was documented, while narrow political institutions 1) cause a country to be viewed more negatively by neighboring liberal states and 2) remove the structural constraint on the country's own foreign policy.

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***Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition***  
(Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1991), Chs. 1, 2,

Dep. V: Snyder wants to explain counterproductive aggressive behavior

Prospective Theories: Realist, Cognitive, Coalition Politics

Measuring Indep. Vs: 1. Report findings of economic historians regarding cartelization  
2. Process trace to see whether political system is cartelized

Case Selection: Main contenders for international power in the industrial era

Kinds of Tests: 1. tests of covariation across countries  
2. covariation over time within a country  
3. tests of covariation across individuals and groups within cases

**Ch.1 – The Myth of Security through Expansion**

Snyder argues that imperial great powers (esp. 20<sup>th</sup> century Germany and Japan) have tended to overexpand because of the myth that expansion leads to security (expansion is not just offensive but defensive).

Rationales (part of the myth) for expansion include:

1. Domino Theory: Cumulative Gains and Losses: Conquest, especially in underdeveloped but resource-rich peripheries, increases power and also deprives other great powers of obtaining these resources (cumulative gains lead to security). Losses in the periphery could collapse the imperial core (dominoes or cumulative losses).
2. Offensive (incl. First Strike) Advantage: so preventive aggression is the best defense.
3. Paper Tigers and Bandwagons: Faith in Threats. Threats make other states compliant, and they will bandwagon with you rather than ally against you.
  - vs. – b.of p. logic: an overwhelming counter-coalition will form (self-encirclement)
  - rising costs of expansion: costs outstrip benefits at hinterland (overextension)

**Ch. 2 – (Types of) Explanations for Overexpansion**

1. Realist: ‘Aggressive defense’ is sometimes a valid strategy, not necessarily a myth
  - Problems: - Logical: Realist’s own b. of p. logic argues against aggressive defense
  - Empirical: they accept decision-makers’ own superficial justifications for their choices, neglecting the presence of plausible alternatives at the time

**Two more rationalist accounts include: (A) Overexpansion occurs due to cost-benefit miscalculations regarding aggressive defense strategies [Snyder: why do they always err toward overexpansion?] (B) Policy-makers rationally pursue perverse (non-security) preferences, acknowledging their security risks [Snyder: they rarely acknowledged these risks, and in fact argues that they were protecting security].**

2. Cognitive: Myths of empire are purely intellectual biases (though they may be held by an entire nation and generation) – strategic ideas are beliefs derived from formative experience (ie. Munich for the US), which come to play as hardened axioms persisting even in the face of disconfirming evidence. [Snyder: such strong lessons are rarer than

myths of empire. Usually, statesman present convenient historical analogies to justify policies chosen for other reasons.]

- 3.\*\* Domestic Political Explanations: Coalition Logrolling and Coalition Ideology  
**Snyder argues that “myths of empire (or security through expansion) arise as rationalizations for the interests of groups that derive parochial benefits from expansion, from military preparations associated with expansion, or from the domestic political climate brought about by intense international competitions.”**  
**(Groups act rationally in their own self-interest to lead to irrational state strategies.)**

### **The Mechanism:**

- (A)** Imperial groups generally enjoy political advantages, usually through
- a. Easy organization for collective action: The benefits of empire are more concentrated than their costs. Those few likely to benefit – militaries interested in growth, wealth, prestige, autonomy (if not war per se), as well some industrial groups – are more likely to overcome collective action than diffuse interests against expansion.
  - b. Monopolies on information: (i.) These groups exploit their reputation for expert knowledge to justify self-serving policies. (ii.) They have organizational and material resources for those politicians, journalists, foundations, etc. who support them.
  - c. Ties to the state: Parochial interest groups are often heavily represented in the highest organs holding legitimate state power. Also, the state itself arguably has an interest in war and empire, as it justifies state expansion.

**NB. The extent of these advantages is determined by the type of political system. Ideal types include: (i) Democracies: Power is diffused and those opposed to expansion can check logrolling and mythmaking by state officials information monopolies are likely to be broken. (ii) Unitary systems: Power is concentrated in the hands of a dictator/oligarchy with broad economic and bureaucratic interest and concern. Such systems are likely to keep the overall national interest in mind, and so keep overexpansion in check.**

**(B)** Of particular interest to Snyder are ‘Cartelized’ political systems, which enjoy these advantages to the largest extent. Power assets (material, organizational, informational) are held primarily by narrowly interested parochial groups, which form ruling coalitions by ‘logrolling’ their programs. Two forms of logrolled overexpansion include:.

- a. Multiple expansion: Pursuing several distinct imperial projects simultaneously. Individually each may carry relatively little risk, but when combined they produce overwhelming strategic overcommitment and self-encirclement.
- b. Offensive détente: offense on one or several fronts, and détente (and free trade) on another. This tricky strategy might satisfy everyone but is likely to fall apart.

**NB.** Often logrolled policies are disastrous even for the logrollers. Why not defect?

- a. collective action problems within the coalition: each logroller has stronger interest to pursue its parochial interest in expansion than collective (and LR) interest in restraint.
- b. pressure from above and below: top leaders in cartelized systems tend to be coalition managers whose position depends on maintaining the logroll. Mass publics are not informed citizens, but are mobilized through ideological appeals.

- c. Blowback: There is always the possibility of self-delusion from propaganda; the ‘myth of empire’ can over time become genuine belief rather than just tactical justification – in particular, successor elite generations may be socialized into the ideology. (Even if they are not, they may be politically trapped into carrying out its precepts.) The risk of blowback is especially high in cartelized systems, where propaganda is presented as ‘objective,’ and where (ideologically driven) mass backing is important for political position.
- d. Immobile interests and short time horizons. Cartels are usually tied into narrow economic sectors/bureaucratic skills that may become obsolete. Especially if a parochial group’s power is in decline, it is more likely to act recklessly in a last-ditch attempt to retain its power (even risking LR societal and personal costs).

(C) The type of political system is partially explained by the timing and process of industrialization.

- a. Timing of industrialization: (i) Early industrialization, such as that of the US or Britain, tends to result in diffuse elite interests and mass democracy. (ii) Late industrialization, such as that of Germany or Japan, is associated with immobile, concentrated elite interests and cartelized politics. (iii) ‘Late, late industrialization,’ such as with the USSR, is associated with hypercentralized political and economic system, which produces a relatively unified elite with relatively encompassing interests.
- b. The process of industrialization itself (regardless of timing) tends to produce some cartelization: society at one time can include many groups that seem part of seemingly disparate eras (ie. Aristocracy, bourgeois, technocrats, working class). There is a sociopolitical stalemate when new groups have grown in strength but old groups are still present – in this case, ruling coalitions can sometimes only be formed by logrolling deeply opposed interests. This will exacerbate cartelized politics.

**Snyder: pp. 235-280**

Cognitive explanations of the Soviet politics of overexpansion, such as the Bolshevik operational code, and cognitive learning models face three problems.

First, they are nonfalsifiable: any such explanation could concurrently explain any Soviet’s behavior and its opposite (Bolshevik “pushes to the limit” yet “knows when to stop”, but “none of operational code theorists have explained how he knows when to stop”).

Second, an emphasis on the offensive bias as the legacy of Bolshevik operational code fails to consider that Lenin and Bolshevism’s political legacy was too ambivalent to leave a systematically “offensive bias” for future foreign policy choices: Lenin and the old Bolsheviks were not different from typical realists and thus not oblivious of balance of power as well as militant offensive propensity; (cultural explanations of Soviet politics -- based on the Leninist legacy – are nonfalsifiable “if they admit the ambivalence of that legacy” or erroneous if they overestimate those aspect of Bolshevik cultural politics that utterly overlook “offensive strategies”).

Third, these explanations offer but very poor “predictions of the timing of offensive overextension”. Additionally, learning cognitive explanations do not offer evidence that is only explicable by cognitive theories and not by others.

Institutional explanations – the preference and power of individual interest group – are necessary, but not sufficient to explain the Soviet’s overexpansion politics of almost three decades of 1950s-1970s; “dynamics of logrolling” and “strategic mythmaking” by coalition leaders were also at work. Soviet’s expansionist behavior has had roots in intellectual legacy of Stalin’s revolution. “Atavistic interests” together with military/industrial budget priorities and militant promotion of “progressive change” abroad have exploited the Stalinism ideology to justify their dominant social role. The Soviet Union’s political character, as a late industrializer, provides the most comprehensive explanation for both periods of overextension and for years of moderation. International system, too, shaped the Soviet behavior by both providing competitive environment that in turn spurred Stalin’s revolution from above, and through the system of balance of power throughout the periods of relatively unitary politics.

#### **America’s Cold War Consensus:**

**Two competing schools in the late 1940s for America’s national security and foreign policy, called “eastern internationalist school” and “middle western nationalist” school, projected different goals for American foreign policy. While the first school favoured America’s wide participation in multilateral economic and military institutions designed to stabilize western Europe in the face of the Soviet threat, the second one resisted costly commitments of American money and troops to Europe and favoured instead extensive use of air power to contain the global expansion of communism. While they disagreed about the priorities, they both agreed about the necessity of setting priorities so as to have “a solvent grand strategy” and to avoid costly open-ended commitments and low-benefit endeavours. Despite this, America had two costly endeavours in Korea and Vietnam in this era.**

Nonetheless, The U.S.’s limited overexpansion attitude (only two obvious cases) and learning from those experiences need to be explained. “One factor contributing to the Cold War consensus in favour of a globalist strategy of containment was the political competitions and coalition building between ‘Europe-first internationalist’ and ‘Asia-first nationalist’”. This was only a contributing factor far from being regarded as the sole determinative factor in American consensus in favour of a globalist strategy of containment. Neither realist nor cognitive explanations can provide full explanation for this consensus.

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***Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics***  
(New York: Columbia Up, 1996)



## **Chapter 1: Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security"**

I. Introduction -- The introductory passages emphasize the increased salience of ideas (norms, identities, and culture) as explanatory variables in the post-Cold War world. Katzenstein asserts that the main analytical perspectives in IR -- neorealism and neoinstitutionalism -- failed to foreshadow the major changes in the international system in the 1990s, leaving analysts of all theoretical persuasions uncertain as to how to interpret the consequences of change. This time of uncertainty is an opportunity to develop new perspectives on international security.

(Ironically, though, the two empirical chapters assigned from this book look at the salience of norms and identity in periods of time that predate the end of the Cold War -- Risse-Kappen on the history of NATO and Finnemore on humanitarian intervention in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Have norms and identities become more salient as Katzenstein says, or were they important all along and analysts just became more sensitive to them with the end of bipolarity?)

II. Definitions for terms used throughout the book:

A. Norms -- these describe collective expectations of an actor with a given identity. In some cases, norms can operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, i.e. they can have "constitutive effects." In other cases, their effects are "regulative" in that they specify proper behavior for an actor with an already defined identity.

B. Identity -- varying constructions of state- or nationhood.

C. Culture -- used here as a broad label to denote collective models of nation-state authority or identity, carried by custom or law. Culture here includes both evaluative standards (norms, values) as well as cognitive standards that define what actors exist in a system and how they relate to one another.

III. Katzenstein next explains that the book deliberately focuses on traditional security issues (material capabilities and the control and use of military force by states) even though new conceptions of security (stressing issues such as economic competitiveness, environmental threats, nonstate actors, and so on) have been gaining currency since the 1970s. The idea is to test ideational variables in hard cases, i.e. if they can be shown to matter within this narrow context, it should be easy to apply them to the broader conceptions of security

III. Relevant shortcomings of neorealism and neoinstitutionalism:

A. Both of these perspectives on IR take interests as exogenous, i.e. they are assumed, which leads to serious gaps in their explanatory power that are acknowledged in some cases (eg., Keohane). The attempt in this book is to endogenize interests by examining how norms and identity shape them.

B. Gilpin's work notes the importance of identity (revisionist vs. status quo states) and prestige in IR, but relates these issues to material rather than ideational factors.

C. This book relaxes two assumptions that underpin these two perspectives. First, it relaxes the neorealist premise and asks what happens when the international system

includes qualities other than those stemming from the physical capabilities of states? Having done that, what happens if, in contrast to neoinstitutionalism, the focus of analysis shifts from the constraints on interests imposed by institutions?

#### IV. Two Social Determinants to be Examined: Cultural-Institutional Context and Collective Identity

A. Cultural-Institutional Context: Explanations of this kind emphasize the role of norms, whether they operate at the level of a specific organization or internationally. The development of norms at the international level is obviously closely related to regime theory and institutionalism -- the emphasis here appears to be on distinguishing between compliance with norms stemming from the rational pursuit of some utility (institutionalism) and compliance for more "social" reasons.

B. Collective Identity: Unlike the previous variable, identity considerations do not simply regulate behavior; they also constitute the actors whose behavior is in question. The identities of states emerge from their interactions with both domestic and international environments.

V. The need for closer examination of ideational variables is clear when one reviews the IR scholarship that touches upon these concepts. Snyder's *Myths of Empire* at one point discusses how the "blowback of propaganda" can trap decisionmakers in political-ideational contexts they themselves created, but fails to explore the full implications of this idea. Similarly, Walt's Balance of Threat theory represents a major revision of neorealism and opens the door to a host of ideational questions relating to threat perception and identity. These issues warrant much more thorough investigation.

VI. The point of the book is not to test interest-based explanations against idea-based explanations, but rather to see how identities and norms help shape the formation of interests in the first place. In this way, Katzenstein is departing from the approach of Goldstein and Keohane, who argue that these two types of explanations must be seen as separate and tested against each other. Instead, Katzenstein appears to take an approach more similar to Wendt, though he is not nearly as radical in his application of it.

### Chapter 5: Finnemore

-Focuses on the new wave of international military interventions, theoretically for humanitarian purposes, focusing on the way that interventions has been differentially justified throughout history and the way international norms impacted the type and frequency of interventions.

-Argues that interests as defined by realism do not fully explain new cases of international intervention such as Somalia and Bosnia. Such actions do not appear to be in the national interests of the intervening nations, whether defined in security or economic terms.

-Could say support for democracy/liberalism motivated intervention, but US disavowal of nation-building in Somalia and refusal to overthrow Hussein in Iraq demonstrates that democracy promotion does not lie at the heart of current interventions.

-Thus, need a different type of approach to understand why intervention occurred: argues that attention to international norms and the way they structure interests in coordinated ways across the international system provides such an approach; a norms approach addresses an issue obscured by approaches that treat interests exogenously; focuses on the way interests change

-Normative context shapes the context of interest and policy actions; it creates broad patterns of actions; norms evolve with changes in social interactions because they are socially constructed.

-Constructivist approach does not deny that power and interest are important, but asks different question: what are interest? What are the ends and means to which power will be used?

-Thesis: norms about who should be protected and the way they should be protected explain changes in international humanitarian intervention

-Could argue that examining justifications for intervention doesn't provide a complete explanation because justifications are disguises for true motivations. However, untangling precise motivations can be hard because motives are also mixed; justification is also important because it relates to the way actions are connected to the international community.

Analysis valuable for 4 reasons:

1. humanitarian justifications for intervention are not new, but the content of those justifications have changed over time.
2. Specifically, interpretations of WHICH human beings merit intervention has changed. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, western states only evaluated Christian populations as "worthy" of intervention. Recently, a more expansive definition has taken hold
3. norms evolve in part through challenges to previous consensus. Humanitarian norms have not been fully accepted, but they have risen in prominence
4. in the context of broader norms, intervention is only one manifestation of changes in a larger set of norms that have developed in the last 150 years, specifically norms of decolonization and self-determination.
5. The structuring and organization of the international normative context is important. Examination of humanitarian norms and intervention suggests that norm institutionalization, the way norms are embedded in international organizations and

institutions, is critical to patterns of norm evolution; institutionalization further increases the power and elaboration of the normative claims.

Decolonization and self-determination norm change involved a redefinition and universalization of “humanity” for Europeans that changed the evaluation of sovereignty and of humanitarian discourse.

-Norms can be mutually reinforcing; should think of norms as part of a highly structured social context, not individually

-As concept of humanity expanded, humanitarian intervention in a wider variety of circumstances considered more legitimate. Norms now allow intervention in cases of disaster or abuse with 2 limits:

1. permissive norms only, don't require intervention
2. place strict requirements on method of intervention (multilateral, with the UN, intervening powers should not have stake in dispute)

-recent interventions exhibit the qualitative dimension of multilateralism; organized according to and in defense of generalized principles of international responsibility and the use of military force, many of which are codified in the UN charter, declarations, and standard operating procedures.

-contemporary multilateralism is political and normative, not strategic; shaped by shared notions of when the use of force is legitimate and appropriate; contemporary legitimacy criteria for the use of force derive from these shared principles, articulated most often through the UN, about consultation/coordination with other states and about multinational composition of forces.

-Multilateral norms create political benefits for conformance and costs for non-conformance; no necessary benefit to multilateral intervention v. unilateral intervention, meaning norms fill the explanatory void.

-Humanitarian intervention has changed over time in \_ ways:

1. definition of who qualifies as human and is deserving of protection has expanded
2. intervention has become necessarily multilateral

-development occurred through continual contestation over norms related to humanitarian intervention.

### *Ch. 10. Thomas Risse-Kappen: Collective Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO*

- **Main argument**

: “A security community based on collectively shared value (p.393)” is a more appropriate approach to explain the origin of NATO, the interaction among allied states and the future of NATO after the End of the Cold War than a traditional(realist) alliance approach.

### 1) The Puzzle

There are several questions on the origin of NATO, the consistent cooperation among allied states of NATO despite severe interallied conflicts, and the future of NATO after the Cold War. The author claims that “ **a social constructivist interpretation of republican liberalism, emphasizing collective identities and norms of appropriate behavior**”(p.358) can give better answers on those questions.

### 2) Theorizing About Alliances

(1) Realism and NATO: the Indeterminacy of the Conventional Wisdom

#### \* **Waltzian arguments**

: “While great powers may not need allies to ensure their survival, client states might become an asset in the competition between the two hegemonic rivals.” (p.360)

#### \* **Walt**

: The main reason why states make alliances is **balance of threat rather than balance of power**

Let’s apply this approach to the case of the Soviet Union

: The types of threat are geographical proximity to Europe, Moscow’s offensive military doctrine, and the aggressive communist ideology.

⇒ The limitation of this explanation is that it cannot give sufficient explanation why the U.S. emphasized the role of Western Europe and decided to join NATO as an ally.

Based on Waltz’s claim, the contribution of small allied states to alliances is important although it is not essential for maintaining alliances. However, in reality, the European allies have continuously exerted crucial influence on the U.S. foreign policy even though the issues were about the U.S. national interests.

On the future of NATO after the end of the Cold War, Waltz states, “NATO is a disappearing thing. It is a question of how long it is going to remain as a significant institution even though its name may linger on.”(p.363) However, it still exists and remains the dominant security communities after the end of Cold War.

### (2) An Alternative Explanation

As an alternative approach toward a traditional (realist) alliance theory, the author presents that domestic politics and structures, which emphasize the role of norms and security community, should be adapted to explain the questions on NATO.

: Two domestic level variables (a) institutional constraints (b) the norms governing democratic decision-making processes

### **3) A Liberal Interpretation of the Transatlantic Security Community**

#### (1) The origin of NATO

: An institutionalization of the security community to respond to a specific threat (p.372)

- The main reason why the US allied with Europe is based on the Soviet behavior which means the efforts to expand its domestic order (communism) toward Eastern Europe.

#### (2) The interaction patterns among NATO allied states

: The results of influences by transnational and transgovernmental coalitional building process.

(Two Case study) the 1956 Suez Crisis/ the 1962 Cuban missile crisis

##### (a) The 1956 Suez Crisis: the Violation of Community Norms

=>Although two allies, the UK and France violated “fundamental collective understandings, trust and confidence, that constituted NATO, the US and the allied were usually resolved through cooperation and compromise.

##### (b) The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis: Collective Identity and Norms.

A Puzzle in this case

: **“Why does the US care about allies when national survival is endangered?”** (p.386)

“The European countries not only were regularly informed about the US deliberations but had ample opportunities to influence American thinking through a variety of bilateral and multilateral channels.”(p.387) There were also close networks among US ambassadors to NATO allies to discuss this issue.

- Two alliance issues:
  - (a) Berlin (a symbol of the role of the North Atlantic Alliance) and (b) Turkey (a political symbol of alliance cohesion of the US commitment to NATO and to Turkey)
 ⇒ These networks among allies and the constraints in decision-making process shaped the US’s interests and preferences during the Cuban missile crisis.

#### (3) The End of the Cold War and the Future of NATO

Liberal theory only assumes that the security partnership among liberal democracies will persist in on institutionalized form or another. NATO can exist as the dominant security community or it can be transformed some other types of security community.

#### *4) Conclusion: How Unique Is NATO*

The shared norms and rules have created several cooperative security communities like NATO. However, based on two comparing criteria, the degree of institutionalization of the community and the extent to which collective identities have developed among its members, “NATO is not unique but exemplifies interaction patterns and collective identities that are quite common for security communities among democracies.”(p.399)

### **CH. 12: PAUL KOWERT & JEFFREY LEGRO: “NORMS, IDENTITY, AND THEIR LIMITS: A THEORETICAL RESPONSE.”**

Norms are the “regulative cultural content of international policies,” while identities are “regulative accounts of actors themselves.” K & L address raise two central questions:

- (i) Is there a payoff in focusing on behavioral norms and identities, as opposed to individualism and materialism?
- (ii) If so, then where do norms come from?

#### HOW NORMS MATTER (454-468).

Rather than arguing that realism or liberalism are wrong, the authors suggest that their theoretical foundations are not equipped to take account of the impact of norms. Some bottom-up theories focusing on individual choice (eg. economic individualism) tend to face aggregation problems, to which institutional models can provide an effective response. Structural theories, on the other hand, adopt a top-down logic, and structure can be divided into material and social aspects, whereby “social structure refers to the cultural context of actor behavior” (459). While the realist structure is primarily uni-dimensional (power), neoliberal institutionalism allows for a potentially greater influence of norms, conventions and principles. However, it tends to focus more on formal institutions and treaties, rather than “less formal social expectations” (460).

According to K & L, a considerable variation in behavior remains unexplained. Enter social, normative structures, in three groups of arguments (ref. to entire Katzenstein volume):

#### (1) The effect of norms on interests:

International norms may shape the interests of leaders, which may explain action in the cases of Somalia or Cambodia, in which there were no (or few) material national interests. Norms associated with the spread of democracy may also have contributed to the promotion of NATO (462-63).

#### (2) The instrumental impact of norms:

Norms may shape the available or appropriate instruments or means that states will use. Unilateral action and certain types of weapons are seen as inappropriate. Realism has difficulty in explaining this fact. Moreover, internal cultural norms may dictate anti-militarist defense policies (Germany, Japan) (463-465).

#### (3) Normative Structure:

Behavioral norms may encourage the formation of national identities (eg. pan-Arabism), but may also have a profound impact on personal conceptions of identity (eg. Samurai, Eskimos). Interaction across levels of norms is thus possible, and “the interlocking web of norms, in turn, shapes the particular interests of political agents” (468).

#### THE SOURCES OF NORMS (469 - 483).

K & L challenge the authors of the Katzenstein volume to “take their own criticisms seriously and to develop more explicitly theoretical propositions about the construction of

sociopolitical facts” (469). The propose three processes (other than “norms causing other norms”) that lead to norm formation and change, which are (1) ecological; (2) social and (3) internal. (Ref. Fig. 12.2; note similarity to schema Prof. Moravcsik presented earlier in the course).

(1) Ecological Processes:

Norms, under this conception, are created and changed. through the “patterned interaction of actors and their environment.” Actors may confront either a quickly changing, continuous, or ‘murky’ environment. Murkiness or ambiguity lies in the perception of actors (eg. Gorbachev’s vision was sufficiently ambiguous to elicit allegiance among moderately competing political factions to pursue a common goal). The notion of ambiguity, however, must be developed further at the definitional level: Which types of ambiguity lead to norm and identity construction? Similarly, the notion of continuity can cut two ways: Stability or a “fade away” effect. K & L suggest further refinement of this hypothesis. Lastly, dramatic exogenous shocks can “loosen commitments to existing identities and behavioral norms” (eg. WWII), but can, at least initially, be identity-reinforcing (Pearl Harbor, Sept. 11) (474). Greater research is required to determine when shocks challenge vs. reinforce, and how shocks affect the relationship between different levels of norms.

(2) Social Processes:

Social processes can operate through simple “diffusion,” whereby “new collective understandings” may “seep across ‘transgovernmental networks’ like ever-widening inkblots, or they may establish “in-group/out-group differentiation and social role definition” (474-475). In the latter case, continued social interaction would give rise to various “relational identities,” which, in turn, have prompted extensive categorization (eg. “regional leader, independent, faithful ally, liberator, and defender of the faith”). K & L suggest that empirical inquiry focus on the linkages of various social roles and on the extent of their functionality.

(3) Internal Processes:

People crave identity in social relations. Thus, the first question we ask in determining group-belonging is not “Do I like these people,” but “Who am I?”. In other words, cognitive or motivational arguments lead to the same result; “stable in-group and out-group identities” (Citing Turner; 479). Linguistic theories go one step beyond cognitive theories, in that they not only emphasize that people need to make sense out of their world, but that they are compelled to communicate their representations, whereby “the process of communication *is* a process of making sense” (480). K & L argue that psycholinguistic theories and rational choice should be seen as proximate, in that (eg.) the former can often be restated in rational choice terms. While the strength of internal process lies in the ability to better specify its “reductive arguments,” its weakness is the difficulty in aggregating individual choice. (482)



## CHALLENGES IN THE STUDY OF NORMS (483-END):

K & K identify five particular problems:

1. How do we know norms when we see them? By what criteria can we assess norm robustness? How do we distinguish deception and manipulation? There may be a bias toward the ‘norm that worked,’ and what about ‘the norms that never made it?’
2. Norms are ever-present, so, whatever, the outcome, norms could easily have been the cause. A re-integration of norms may provide a solution (Realism: Norms must conform to certain structures).
3. Norms play roles in continuity *and* change, with confusing results. Here, also, a “greater appreciation for the hierarchical integration of cultural themes suggests at least a degree of cultural and normative stability” (489). Alternatively, structures and agents can be seen as mutually constitutive, constantly producing and reproducing each other. Exogenous historical conditions may help us to separate out what constitutes ‘production’ and what constitutes ‘reproduction.’ Or, levels of culture may be ‘nested; within each other. The general consensus is that “norms and identity are constructed through regularized processes, often with relatively stable effects” (490).
4. It is difficult to specify the relationship between the normative and material worlds. Norms “do not float freely” (490). There must be a better, synthetic conceptualization of *how* the material and interpretive worlds interact.
5. The effect of agency on normative analysis is confounding. Is it useful to distinguish between *internal* and *external* norms? If norms are a collective phenomenon, don’t they all have to be external? Yes, if the actor is an individual. Less clear if the actor is a collective. Moreover, the potential for the self-conscious manipulation of external norms presents a problem for scholarship: “Some variables (agents) are directly *aware* of other variables ... Since scholarly inquiry is itself interpretation (thus the product of agency), can it presume to investigate interpretive phenomena such as norms without, by the nature of the scientific enterprise, altering their meanings?” (494). K & L answer this concern by arguing that the quest should not be one of replacing interpretation with objectivity, but of providing better historical accounts and raising new questions.”

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**Peter M. Haas: “Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy coordination”**

(*International Organization*, v. 46, n. 1, winter 1992, pp. 1-35)

This article introduces an issue of *International Organization* dedicated to discussing the role of epistemic communities in inter-state policy coordination. Haas argues that modern decision-makers have faced growing technical complexity and uncertainties in addressing policy issues, and thus increasingly have relied on knowledgeable experts. A network of such experts can create an "epistemic community" in which members share technical knowledge related to a particular field as well as normative principles, causal beliefs, and a shared conception of interests. Because of their claim to expertise, such epistemic communities can diffuse norms and values as well as technical knowledge and thereby influence policy outcomes.

The author introduces competitive explanations for national behavior, including conditioning by systemic factors, unit-level factors, as well as interactions between the two, and raises the question of whether states promote non-material values (ideas) (1). Haas admits that systemic conditions and domestic pressures impose constraints on state behavior, but argues that states have wide latitude in choosing actions. Moreover, states' choices are influenced by how they define their interests, how problems are framed, and what alternatives are presented (2,4). The author proposes mechanisms by which epistemic communities influence this process, arguing that communities of authoritative experts control and channel information to decision-makers and thereby can foster new patterns of state behavior (2-4).

Since Haas is only introducing other articles, he does not offer detailed evidence or empirical testing in his article. However, he introduces a general claim that in several policy areas, epistemic communities framed the issues for debate and thereby influenced subsequent developments consistent with their preferred outcomes. These policy areas include international trade in services, nuclear arms control, management of whaling, protection of stratospheric ozone, food aid, international banking regulation, and creation of the foundations of the post-World War II economic order (5).

The article discusses the origins of epistemic communities, beginning with the growth of professionalization in Western societies, which included increasing professionalization and bureaucratization of public policy-making (8-9). This fostered growth of trans-organizational and even trans-national communities of professional experts and increased decision-makers' tendencies to defer to policy-area experts (9-10). Haas admits that policy choices remain highly political, especially when scientific advice is ambiguous or conflicting, or when issues involve allocation of resources (11-12). However, the advice of area experts holds more sway under uncertainty, such as when crises arise or a new policy arena forms in which policy-makers have limited preconceptions concerning the state's interests or policy alternatives (14-16,29).

The article defines an epistemic community as a network of professionals with recognized expertise in a particular area and an authoritative claim as a source of policy-relevant knowledge. Such a community shares the following features:

- normative and principled beliefs
- causal beliefs
- notions of validity (criteria for evaluating knowledge in their domain of expertise)
- policy enterprise (common practices associated with a set of policy problems) (3,16-18)

Epistemic communities differ from interest groups because the communities' shared causal beliefs and understandings of cause-and-effect shape their interests, rather than vice-versa. Unlike interest groups, they are not focused on outcomes that are contrary to their causal beliefs (18).

Haas investigates approaches that emphasize the social construction of reality and psychological theories of decision-making. He rejects the notions of "radical constructivists" who contend that "...there is no 'objective' basis for identifying material reality and all claims for objectivity are therefore suspect" (21). Instead, he allies his approach (and the approach of most of the articles in the edited volume) with what he calls "a limited constructivist view." This approach assumes that while the categories by which objective reality is identified are socially constructed, a "...consensus about the nature of the world is possible in the long run" (23). Hence, while epistemic communities "...provide consensual knowledge, they do not necessarily generate truth" (23).

Haas then turns to the role of ideas in determining policy choices (26-28). He recognizes that "[i]t is the political infiltration of an epistemic community into governing institutions which lays the groundwork for a broader acceptance of the community's beliefs and ideas about the proper construction of social reality" (27). However, determining the mechanisms by which ideas are diffused and accepted is a problematic area of social science research. "Without compelling answers to the questions that remain in this regard, it is difficult to support the argument that ideas are independent variables and not just intervening variables" (27). He adds that epistemic communities act to channel ideas to decision-makers and also circulate ideas between states. Combining these notions with psychological theories of decision-making can specify the exact mechanisms that explain the independent causal role of ideas in policy outcomes (27-34).

Haas concludes with guidance for further research and outlines the following tasks:

- identifying community membership
- determining the community members' principled and causal beliefs
- tracing communities' activities and demonstrating their influence on decision makers
- identifying alternative outcomes that were foreclosed because of communities' influence
- exploring alternative explanations for the actions of decision-makers.

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**Masato Kimura and David A. Welch, "Specifying 'Interests': Japan's Claim to the Northern Territories and Its Implications for International Relations Theory,"**  
*International Studies Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (1998), pp. 213-244.

The argument: The Japanese government's position demanding the return of the Northern Territories (the "Territories") from Russia cannot be explained in terms of the instrumental value of the Territories, but only by factoring in the importance of their recovery to the Japanese sense of identity (i.e., the intrinsic value of the Territories). Political scientists should carefully examine interest-formation and interest-specification of particular states (and patterns across states) to derive state preferences, rather than assuming or deriving them from ancillary theories. In short, researchers should treat "interests" as exogenous variables.

State interests can be identified by three methods (which are roughly aligned in a continuum going from general to specific) (see p. 216, fig. 1):

- a) Assumption (e.g., interests assumed by structural factors of the international system - Waltz);
- b) Derivation from ancillary theory (e.g., Milner's domestic interest model), in accordance with three models,
  - a. Model A - exogenizes relative strength of interest groups
  - b. Model B - exogenizes relative strength and preferences of interest groups
  - c. Model C - exogenizes relative strength, preferences, and identities of interest groups; or
- c) Empirical discovery (e.g., country-specific area study approach).

K&W argue that Model C is the best method of identifying state interests and attempt to demonstrate this with the case study of the Territories, which, by nature of being a territorial dispute, would appear amenable to preference derivation or assumption.

The instrumental value of the Territories cannot explain Japan's foreign policy stance:

- a) Economic value - the Territories are small and lack natural resources and infrastructure, though there is some value in the maritime area.
- b) Strategic value - though the Soviet Union placed substantial (but arguably unfounded) strategic value on the Territories (as protection for the Sea of Okhotsk submarine bastion), this rationale has declined since the end of the Cold War and does not apply to Japan, except derivatively.
- c) Opportunity cost - Japan has suffered a high opportunity cost by insisting on a return of the Territories, straining the Russo-Japanese and G-7 relationships, undercutting the credibility of Japanese diplomacy, and damaging Japan's global role and reputation.

The intrinsic value of the Territories bears greater explanatory power over Japan's position:

- a) K&W first concede that their measurement of the intrinsic value is "problematic from a social scientific perspective" (p. 226), and that it necessarily invokes the concept of identity.
- b) Comments by analysts and observers reveal both a moral imperative and considerations not purely based on entitlement in demanding return of the Territories.
- c) Senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japanese Defense Agency officials frame the problem in moral, legal, and symbolic (but not instrumental) terms.
- d) The claim to the four islands (the "four-island formula") is inconsistent with the diplomatic history, which reveals that at times Japan was willing to settle for more or less island territory. This may be explained by the persistence of the Liberal Democratic Party, which assumed power when the four-island formula emerged in 1956. "[S]ocialization processes can explain how the sense of entitlement, and Japanese expectations, have crystallized around [the four-island formula]." (p. 231)
- e) Despite the lack of personal experience with the Territories, the claim for their return can be explained by the Japanese sense of identity. Put simply, "[t]he Japanese sense of identity includes the Northern Territories." (p. 232)

Implications:

The Japanese claim to the Territories "has discouraging implications for those who would prefer to assume state interests, or to derive them from an efficient, portable ancillary theory." (p. 232) K&W argue that political scientist attempting to describe preference formation must necessarily examine the phenomenon from an interdisciplinary point of view. Though this caution is not generalizable merely from the evidence presented, K&W argue there is suggestive reason to believe that taking into account norms, ideas, cultures, and social structures will lead to a better explanation of foreign policy and the decisions of state leaders.

Lastly, K&W answer some common objections to their approach, with some broader perspectives:

- a) The claim for the Northern Territories is at heart a security issue since Japan considers the Territories its homeland. This arguably contradicts what systemic IR theories would predict.
- b) In general, IR theory does not adequately explain territorial claims against other nations.
- c) Even if IR theory were not concerned with predicting Japanese foreign policy in this particular instance, this case points towards the weakness of making strong assumptions about state interests.
- d) Even though attachments to territory are not uncommon, the particular attachments groups form (e.g., the four-island formula) are very difficult to explain, particularly with systemic factors.

- e) Pure domestic distributional arguments are not necessarily sufficient in explaining the Territories claim, since no clear material distributional gain is necessarily to be had.