

WEEK 6

NON-RATIONALIST DECISION- MAKING: IDEAS, BELIEFS AND LEARNING

Alastair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Peter Katzenstein (ed.), *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 216-68.

- I. Neo-Realism vs. Strategic Culture Overview
 - VII. Constructivists have tended to focus on non-realpolitik behavior in IR, ceding the turf of realpolitik foreign policy to realists. Research on strategic culture raises the possibility of explaining realpolitik foreign policy with ideational variables.
 - VIII. The realist response to strategic culture arguments is to say that such culture is epiphenomenal, a product of the logic of anarchy. The realists' arguments in this respect rest on three problematic claims, however:
 1. Only non-realpolitik behavior can be ideational in origin.
 2. Realist theory makes determinate predictions without ideational variables.
 3. Realpolitik ideology is epiphenomenal.
 - IX. An analysis of the Chinese case challenges these claims, or at least shows that they are too weak to dismiss strategic culture as an explanation for realpolitik behavior.
- II. The Choice of China as a Test of Strategic Culture
 2. China has traditionally been viewed as having a non-Realist strategic culture, but this characterization misses the mark.
 3. There are actually two distinct traditions in Chinese strategic thought: a Confucian-Mencian paradigm that stresses non-violent accommodationist strategies, and a parabellum or hard realpolitik paradigm that stresses sensitivity to changes in relative capabilities and offensive uses of force.
 4. The parabellum paradigm has been the dominant discourse in Chinese history, while the Confucian-Mencian approach is vague about certain key strategic issues and often dismissed in the dominant discourse as relevant only to the ancient past.
- III. Conceptual and Methodological Approach
 - A. First define strategic culture in a way that is falsifiable. It is defined here as consisting of two parts:
 1. Basic assumptions about the orderliness of the strategic environment (is war aberrant or normal? does the nature of the adversary make conflicts zero-sum or variable-sum? how effective is the use of force?)
 2. Operational ideas that apply the basic assumptions to the threat environment and result in ranked preferences for grand strategy (are offensive, defensive, or accommodationist strategies most appropriate?)
 3. The development of ranked strategic preferences is key so that the culture is falsifiable – if these preferences change over time, a consistent strategic culture cannot be said to exist.

- A. Test for strategic culture in the formulative texts of a certain country – in China’s case the *Seven Military Classics* is the obvious choice. Using these texts, the researcher can develop cognitive maps that indicate how the writer thinks foreign policy goals should be pursued.
- B. Test for the influence of strategic culture on behavior as compared to other explanations.

IV. The Maoist Paradigm: Johnston investigates a collection of key writings from Mao that span his career to develop insight into his strategic thinking.

- C. The Nature of Conflict: Mao did not just see conflict as inevitable but desirable – it was the process through which history moved forward and contradictions were resolved. He came to this view even before accepting Marxist-Leninist arguments on class conflict.
- D. The Nature of the Adversary: Mao had a complicated conception here, dividing contradictions into antagonistic and non-antagonistic (the latter did not require elimination but rather transformation -- though political education, for example). There were also primary and secondary contradictions – the latter could be temporarily subordinated to the former. In any case, Mao appeared to believe that at some point contradictions between two adversaries would become primary and antagonistic, and thus enter a zero-sum universe.
- E. The Role of Violence: Mao clearly endorsed the use of force as an approach to resolving contradictions. Looking at a number of specific writings, Johnston picks out a few key themes:
 - 1. Military force is almost always required to solve security problems.
 - 2. Offensive uses of force are the key to victory; defense is just a temporary stage and inadequate for victory.
 - 3. Relative material power is the key to military victory.
- A. Johnston concludes that the Maoist paradigm fits comfortably within the parabellum tradition described above. It is difficult to disentangle the influence of traditional Chinese strategic culture on Mao from Clausewitzian and Leninist thinking, both of which could also account for such ideas, but it appears Mao was exposed to traditional Chinese thinking at an earlier age.

V. Strategic Preference Rankings – Mao believed offense was critical to eventual victory, though he did not necessarily favor first strikes (inasmuch as they could arouse sympathy for the opponent elsewhere and tar China with the label “aggressor”). In general, Mao’s writings lead one to expect:

- 2. Framing of the use of force as defensive and just
- 3. Use of force would be initiated after it appeared to Chinese leaders that conflict was imminent
- 4. Once conflict appeared to be imminent, Chinese leaders would be expected to see it as zero-sum, prompting quick escalation to wider conflict
- 5. Chinese use of force should be related to changes in relative capabilities – shifts in relative capabilities in China’s favor should precede the use of force.

VI. Actual Chinese conflict behavior since 1949 appears to be consistent with the preference rankings above

- A. China has been more likely than other powers to use force in foreign policy crises in proportional terms (used force in 8 of 11 cases 1949-85).
- B. China was more likely to use force in territorial disputes than other powers, suggesting a more zero-sum orientation. China also seemed more likely to view diplomatic/political conflicts in zero-sum terms as well (although there were only 3 such cases, China used force in two of them (i.e. 67%) -- the percentage for all other actors was 18 percent)
- C. China was quite willing to initiate the use of force in its disputes. Of the 8 cases in which China resorted to force, China initiated the use of force in 5 of them.
- D. China has been sensitive to changing relative capabilities in a conflict in a way that accords with the views described above. Using rough estimates of national power, a shift in power in China's favor in a given year appears to be a necessary but not sufficient condition for China to initiate conflict with an adversary in the following year.

VII. Conclusions and Problems of Analysis

- A. China's strategic tradition does not differ markedly from the Western realpolitik tradition
- B. China's strategic culture appears to be more than "a trivial variable in the analysis of Chinese strategic behavior." There is a deeply rooted consistent set of assumptions about security strategy in China, and these assumptions have persisted across many different state systems in Chinese history.
- C. One problem of analysis is that China's strategic culture generates similar predictions about Chinese behavior compared to "offensive" realism, which leads to charges that strategic culture is merely epiphenomenal. There are two ways of dealing with this problem:
 - 1. Set up a critical test in which predictions of strategic culture and neo-Realism diverge (this is difficult to do since the strategic culture has not varied much)
 - 2. Conduct cross-national studies -- i.e. does non-realpolitik strategic culture in other countries lead to non-realist behavior? Johnston argues it does in the case of democratic security communities.
 - 3. Johnston argues that realism has difficulty explaining the behavior of Chinese empires at their peak. While anarchy was still present at such times, presumably the fear that anarchy breeds was attenuated then. So the tenacity with which Ming China pursued the Mongol threat when the disparity in power meant that it could have been easily ignored or bought off suggests that factors other than realist considerations were at work.
- D. Structural realpolitik can be subsumed within the cultural realpolitik model -- in the presence of a realpolitik strategic culture, one would expect the predictions of structural realists to be on target. In a way, cultural realpolitik saves the structural

- version from the problem that its assumptions about the way states view the world may be wrong.
- E. This suggests that ideas and structure are not necessarily competing explanations but rather can be part of the same theory. There are three ways in which ideas and structure can be related:
1. Structure produces determinate predictions about behavior, but actual behavior is often skewed because of cultural factors.
 2. Structure produces indeterminate predictions about behavior, but does limit the possibilities -- specific behavior is chosen from among these as a function of ideational variables.
 3. Structure is given meaning by cultural factors -- it is seen as anarchical if the strategic ideology at work is realpolitik, or institutionalized if the ideology is idealpolitik.

General Comments:

Is it easier for a country for cultural reasons adopt a consistently hard realpolitik approach than an idealpolitik one? Ming China did not pay much of a price for being paranoid about weak barbarians, but republican China might have been even worse off if it had taken an idealpolitik approach toward Japan in the 1930s. One other hand, you could argue that realpolitik strategic culture leads a country to create conflict where none was necessary.

How special a case is China? Perhaps other countries with shorter histories and more multicultural populations would exhibit less coherent strategic cultures. The US would seem like an interesting case to test in this regard.

What does learning have to say about strategic culture? The Reiter article shows that countries can abandon a certain strategic approach relatively quickly if it was shown to be unsuccessful for that country in the last war. What does this imply for the durability of strategic culture? Has China's historical experience consistently reaffirmed the value of its strategic culture?

Did Mao really believe that the distribution of relative material capabilities vis-à-vis the US favored China in 1950? Is the Chinese intervention in Korea -- which was pushed by Mao in particular -- really consistent with the ideas that were attributed to him in this chapter? In the end, of course, Mao's calculation that China could go head-to-head with the US in Korea was correct.

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Dan Reiter: "Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past", WORLD POLITICS, 46:4 (Jul 1994)

Reiter's central claim is that "alliance choices of minor powers in the twentieth century were determined mainly by lessons drawn from formative national experiences, and only marginally by variations in the level of external threat" (526). The article tests "realist predictions for alliance behavior against those of learning theory." 490).

Reiter begins by exploring learning theory. In short, this theory assumes that "decision makers draw lessons from past experiences to help cope with difficult choices." (491). Social Psychology version of learning implies that schemas will be recalled to "present an explanation for the phenomenon in question." (492). The organizational behavior version of learning suggests that decisions will be based on target oriented, history dependent routines.

Next, Reiter defines the key terms and concepts, restricting the scope of his inquiry. He defines alliances narrowly, as "a formal mutual commitment to contribute military assistance in the event of one of the alliance partners is attacked" (495). Likewise, he limits his inquiry to minor powers alliance choices vis-à-vis great powers. Next, he develops binary specifications for learning from past events. He determines that if a minor power chose neutrality and was not invaded, the choice was successful. Likewise, if a minor power chose alliance and was on the winning side or acquired additional territory after the war, the decision was a success. On the other hand if the minor power chose neutrality and was invaded or chose alliance and was on the losing side, the decision was a failure.

These specifications lead to two hypotheses of learning theory to test:

- (1) A minor power can attempt either alliance or neutrality with a great power in a systemic war. If it experiences failure, it will switch policies following the war; if it experiences success, it will continue that policy
- (2) A systemic war will produce a systemwide lesson on the effectiveness of alliance with a great power based on the sum of experiences of minor powers in the war. All minor powers will adopt policies in congruence with the systemwide lesson in the years following the war.

Reiter then explores traditional realist understandings of alliance formation and raises a number of criticisms of balance of power and balance of threat realism, without rejecting the fundamental realist assumptions. Specifically, he contends that neutrality must remain a valid category. He then provides six hypotheses based on different variants and aspects of realism to test against his learning hypothesis. These include alliance decisions based on perceptions of the likelihood of war, the revisionism of the great power, geography, non-alliance defense commitments, perceived direct threat, and minor power alliance formation.

A data set is then developed for states after WWI and WWII based on four data points in six year intervals after each war.

Reiter's results indicate that "individual learning is a powerful explanation." In other words, states tend to base their alliance decisions on events which happened to them specifically and not on overall systemic lessons of the war. The traditional realist hypothesis appear to have less explanatory value. Reiter then discusses a few regional cases—Scandinavia and the Middle East – to demonstrate how individual learning may have influenced alliance decisions in Scandinavia but does not fully explain decisions in the Middle East.

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John Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neo-Realist Synthesis"

in Keohane, ed. *Neo-Realism and its Critics*, (New York: Columbia UP, 1986)

This chapter deals with a discussion of the extent to which Waltz' theory explains systemic continuity in international politics.

Let's begin then with a brief recap on Waltz' theory would not hurt.

International politics, says Waltz, can best be described in systemic terms.

4 key concepts are involved here. A **system** is this new totality formed by the union of parts [units], a totality enjoying a "specific reality which has its own characteristics" (not Waltz, Durkheim). The **structure** depicts the organization of a system, or the laws of association by which **units** are combined, to form the systemic totality. **Processes** are simply the patterned relations among units that go on within a system.

Waltz' concept of political structure consists of three analytical components:

- (1) the principle according to which the system is ordered or organized;
- (2) the differentiation of units and the specification of their functions; and
- (3) the degree of concentration or diffusion of capabilities within the system.

Given this, *Waltz' central concern is to demonstrate the impact of variations in international structure on international outcomes, and to explain similarities of outcomes over time by structural continuity*. Note that, to be productive, the systems level has to express systemic properties and to explain how these act as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it.

In the case of international politics:

(1) the principle according to which the system is ordered is the absence of central rule. Hence the international structure of *anarchy*, that is, the horizontal organization of authority relations. And self-help units (states) is the fundamental basis of international association.

(2) the differentiation of units is extremely limited, since Waltz asserts that units (states) are compelled to try to be functionally alike. Therefore, since there is no functional differentiation of states (apart from that imposed by relative capabilities), the second component of political structure is not needed at the international level.

(3) capabilities are either economic or military.

A key point to keep in mind is that Waltz thinks of these three (or two) components of the political structure as successive causal depth levels. The “ordering principle” shapes its fundamental social quality. Differentiation, where it exists, mediates (through broad and enduring social institutions) the social effects of the deep structure, but within a context that has already been circumscribed by the deep structure. Lastly, the impact of the distribution of capabilities on outcomes is to magnify or modify the opportunities and constraints generated by the two other structural levels. But since functional differentiation does not exist, in conclusion, *international structures vary only through a change of organizing principles, or, failing that, through variations in the capabilities of units.*

Ruggie’s point, basically, is to reach beyond the confines of conventional realist analysis, without violating its basic premises. An important limit of Waltz’ theory, according to Ruggie, comes from an inappropriate definition of the second level of structure: differentiation between the units, and particularly from the idea that this level should be dropped as a factor of change of the international structures. To put it shortly, bringing back in one dimension of change (namely, the one related to the second level of structure) would correct some of the limits of Waltz’ theory – for instance by giving greater determinate content to the general constraints of anarchy deduced by Waltz.

He illustrates his point by showing that Waltz’ theory provides “no means by which to account for, or even to describe, the most important contextual change in international politics in this millennium: the shift from the medieval to the modern international system.

What does this second structural level deal with? I couldn’t find a clear definition, but Ruggie provides some illustrations, like the form (hegemonic or not) of state/society relations and the nature of property rights, all components of “generative structure” which shape, condition and constrain social behavior.

More generally, Ruggie blames Waltz for not taking into account factors which are shaped by structure but affect structure also in turn. He misses for instance the “dynamic density” of societies, namely, the quantity, velocity and diversity of transactions that go on within society, and which, according to Durkheim, modifies profoundly the

fundamental conditions of collective existence (or of international structure in the context studied by Waltz).

One reason for why Waltz cannot integrate into his theory is that, by reacting to the “reductionist tendencies” in international relations which make the system all product and not productive, Waltz goes to far in the opposite direction, for in his conception unit-level processes become all product and are not at all productive. Ruggie argues on the contrary that, in any social system, structural change itself ultimately has no source other than unit-level processes. This means that Waltz exogenizes the ultimate source of systemic change. Therefore, continuity, in his model, is a product of premise even before it is hypothesized as an outcome! But, this defect can be compensated by reformulating the realist model, that is, by redefining the “second level of structure” (unit differentiation) and including it among the potential factors of change.

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Markus Fischer, “Feudal Europe, 800-1300: Communal Discourse and Conflictual Practices”, *International Organization* 46, 2 (Spring 1992): 427-66.

Fischer sees a new debate in international relations, between proponents of Critical Theory (CT) and Neorealists, with the former critiquing the latter’s “ahistorical, scientific, and materialist conceptions”. According to CT, the Middle Ages “constitute the most important case to support their argument that world politics undergoes fundamental change”. Fischer proposes to examine the discourse and practices of the Middle Ages, in order to test that hypothesis. In doing so, he finds that while feudal actors seem to have been operating in distinct ways, most of the difference is nominal; below the surface they “behaved like modern states”. Thus, Fischer finds that there is no basis for the CT claims for historical change in international politics, which lends support to the Neorealist position that “conflict and power politics are a structural condition of the international realm—present even among individuals in a stateless condition”.

After a brief sketch of the basics of the Neorealist position, Fischer explains the main points of CT. With regard to international relations, CT sees “a community structured by a historically contingent discourse of shared understandings, values, and norms about the principles of political authority and economic production”. These concepts “motivate and guide” actors, who then “reproduce or transform their discourse over time”. Modern politics, according to this view, is shaped by the concept of sovereignty, which CT sees as the origin of conflict and violence, in contrast to medieval times, which were characterized by “communal discourse”.

Fischer does not dispute the nominal difference, but wishes to test “whether feudal actors behaved in accordance with their particular communal norms”. He claims that an examination from this point of view reveals that behavior in the middle ages did not differ from that

prescribed by the politics of sovereignty and described by Neorealist theories. To arrive at this conclusion, Fischer looks at four areas of feudal discourse: unity, functional cooperation, heteronomous and communal relations, and just war resolution. With regard to unity, he finds that despite a long tradition of empire (Rome) and persistent rhetoric regarding a Christian union under God, medieval politics was characterized by extreme fragmentation—"a fluid condition of power politics among atomistic individuals". The situation was similar where functional cooperation is concerned: despite strict doctrines regarding the functions of individuals and orders, norms prescribing one's place were constantly violated, and each actor had to provide for his own security. Unsurprisingly, Fischer finds that this state of affairs extends to heteronomous and communal relations, with actors pretending to observe their obligations and communal values, but in reality engaging in conquest and subjugation (although it is not clear why this falls outside of those roles). Finally, Fischer turns to immanent justice for the resolution of conflicts, which he finds equally hypocritical, since it amounts to nothing more than "self-help".

Fischer concludes that his examination takes away one of the main arguments for those, like Ruggie, who claim that there is change in world politics over time. It confirms Neorealist arguments regarding the role of anarchy (it compels actors to behave in similar ways, despite their differences), and demolishes CT claims regarding change, by alerting proponents of CT to the fact that they should not confuse rhetoric with practice. After pronouncing CT to be "inherently unsuited for the study of international relations", Fischer proceeds to explain the four steps that CT could take to counter his argument. Alas, as all of them are impossible, according to his assessment, his case stands.

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Lars-Erik Cederman, *Emergent Actors in World Politics*
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997)

Chapter 3 - Towards Richer Models

- I. Cederman first elaborates on the problem of historical contingency, arguing that most social scientist fail to distinguish between simple and complex systems. In the presence of nonlinearity initial conditions and complex interaction of independent variables will have dramatic effects on the outcome of events. Any counterfactual will thereby cease to be cotenable (i.e., "connecting principles, including empirical and theoretical mechanism . . . [must] be consistent with the counterfactual scenario" (p. 41)). Cederman argues that any explanation of long-term change "must make the historical paths of the counterfactual scenarios explicit" (p. 43).
- II. Current rationalist theories suffer from biases due to methodological individualism (i.e., "the doctrine that all social phenomena -- their structure

and their change are in principle explicable in ways that only involve individuals," quoting Elster (p. 44-45)) and materialism. They cannot account for intersubjective collective identities (also described as "figurations" or "objective content of thought" (p. 47)) that are not clearly in the positive or normative realm.

- III. To address these problems, Cederman introduces the Complex Adaptive Systems ("CAS") approach. A CAS is defined as "an adaptive network exhibiting aggregate properties that emerge from the local interaction among many agents mutually constituting their own environment" (italics omitted, p. 50). A CAS is characterized by emergent properties, local interaction, a large number of agents, and adaptive nature of agents. The CAS method differs from conventional modeling techniques by its reliance on induction and emphasis on synthesis and engineering (in lieu of reduction).
- IV. The CAS approach enables researchers to (a) model historical contingencies by performing "systematic and controlled [complex] thought experiments" (p. 54), and (b) model collective identities by employing an identity and culture schemata.
- V. Cederman responds to objections to CAS Modeling:
 - a. Ad hoc assumptions: All rationalist models fall prey to these charges, but Cederman attempts to minimize these objections by relying on substantive theory and building the models up step by step.
 - b. Failure to yield unique predictions (nonfalsifiability): Multiple equilibria are inevitable consequences of path dependence and the simulations serve a heuristic rather than a predictive purpose.
 - c. Fragility of results (contingency on parameter specification): Cederman considers this the most serious charge, and responds that the mere fact that certain phenomena are not "amenable to elegant theoretical formalization" is not reason to reject a method of gaining understanding of the world (p. 64).
 - d. Lack of cumulation (difficulty of replication): Cumulation is not a reason to reject the CAS methodology and greater efforts to interpret and convey CAS results will minimize this weakness.

CAS may be characterized as a form of "process-tracing" that defies context-free testing and may lead to a more dynamic understanding of phenomena (potentially falling in line with more constructivist and critical interpretation of IR).

Cederman lastly provides a very brief overview of the four models discussed in the book (see fig. 3.4 & table 3.1, pp. 69-70).

Chapter 4: Emergent Polarity

This chapter argues that state formation and war are two sides of the same coin; applies the logic of neorealism to a wider historical context and establishes the conditions under which its main tenets hold.

-Need an explicitly dynamic and spatial framework that allows for a higher degree of complexity than neorealist models in the microeconomic tradition can offer; Cederman's solution is the Emergent Polarity Model, an artificial geopolitical system that

1. provides an explicit spatial representation of the international system
2. involves a large number of actors
3. endogenizes the outer boundaries of these actors as well as the polarity structure of both the regional and global structure
4. endows these agents with a bounded and historically contingent decision scope

-Asks the question: from where do great powers come?? The intent is to discover how and when balance of power politics emerge

-The key is explaining, in an integrated system, how balance is maintained, especially when polarity is always changing; why does the system not just default to unipolarity?

-Model contains 3 independent variables:

1. anarchy implies power politics
2. defense-dominance increase the likelihood of power politics
3. defense alliances increase the likelihood of power politics

-artificial world made up of 400 actors; distinguishing factors from other approaches

1. actors are territorially defined, each of them surrounded by up to 4 neighbors
2. interact only with their neighbors and have no global knowledge of the system
3. 2 types of actors, predator and prey, corresponding to status quo and revisionist states

-model plays out; territorial neighbors interact locally; both types of states act based on reciprocity, except predator states sometimes attack without provocation; since both sides reciprocate, the result of an attack is war

-model -> 3 things

1. number of states will decrease as predators absorb their victims
2. predatory actors increase in size, territory expanding to the conquered areas
3. surviving states will be predominately predators, since prey get "eaten"

-result is that system stabilizes and polarity shrinks to about 1/10 of the original population, except for occasional jumps that result from imperial collapse

-activating the alliance variables means states can balance against threats and solve collective action problems, etc

Model ends up showing 3 things:

1. competitive pressures -> power politics
2. defensive dominance does NOT lead to realist outcomes
3. defensive alliances do NOT lead to realist outcomes

-it's similar to protectionism or economic cartels in terms of the incentives to cooperate

-prevalence of power politics depends on an explosive positive-feedback mechanism that might lead either to too little or too much integration for the realist predictions to hold

Cederman, Ch. 7: Nationalist Mobilization

Q. Why does the political mobilization/modernization of multinational states sometimes lead to the assimilation of ethnic nations at the periphery and sometimes to their emergence as autonomous regions or independent states?

- (1) Modeling Political Mobilization: The core-periphery relationship. Assuming a process of political mobilization involving the periphery, will there be assimilation (the removal of ethnic/cultural barriers to political communication and adoption of the center's supranational identity) or a creation of a national movement?
- a. Assimilation theories: Ethnic conflict arises from outmoded traditionalism, which will be wiped out with the advent of modernity. (no serious obstacles to assimilation)
 - b. Delayed assimilation theories: Ethnic conflict is a traditional and very stubborn impediment to modernization. Ethnic groups will already be conscious of a separate identity, but there should be indirect assimilation over time and with modernization.
 - c. Provocation theories: Ethnic conflict is an integral part, and even a product, of the modernization process – often modernization is accompanied by calls to nationalism and the standardization of education, language use, etc., which may backfire in the case of ethnic minorities. If the core can control this initial nationalist outburst, it should prevail in assimilating the entire periphery-ethnic population.

(NB. Cederman assumes that non-ethnically differentiated marginalized groups (i.e. workers, peasants) will eventually assimilate (if maybe change) the national identity.)

- (2) Modeling Collective Action: What if the core cannot control the initial nationalist outburst, and there are short run revolutionary disruptions of assimilation w/LR effects?
- the government is likely to remain stable (ie. Not lead to nationalist-independence outbreaks) if assimilation stays ahead of or keeps abreast of mobilization – you don't want to overshoot mobilization of a potentially alienated populace. Cederman's model predicts overshooting if the assimilation rate falls under 50% of the population.
 - Is overshooting the best indicator of nationalist collective action? Does this mean that multinational states mobilize slowly? Not necessarily: multinational states depend on both external (power vs. adversaries) and internal (cohesion) factors.

So...Cederman needs his model (presented p. 168-9) to be dynamic, allowing for both invasion or foreign economic domination as well as secession and the status quo. Mobilization in multinational states must be very careful: too slow a process triggers external intervention, too rapid a mobilization triggers nationalist collective action.

(3) Historical Illustrations

- a. Habsburg empire: low mobilization rate initially prevented nationalist collective action, but eventually led to a weak state unable to face international threats.
- b. Soviet Union (w/Gorbachev): fast mobilization led to a politicized, autonomy-demanding periphery:
- c. European Union: attempts at wide-reaching reforms (under Delors) prompted nationalist reactions that slowed ratification of the Maastricht treaty.

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Yuen Foong Khong, *Analogies of War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965*

(Princeton: Princeton UP, 1992), Chapters 2, 3, 7; pp. 19-68, 174-205

Chapter 2

Khong argues that historical analogies serve as intellectual devices to perform a set of diagnostic tasks. First, they help define the nature of the situation in light of previous situations that may be more familiar. Then, analogies can also give a sense of the political stakes and possible solutions. The fourth, fifth, and sixth tasks pertain to evaluating the policy prescribed on the basis of the analogy: likelihood of success, moral rightness, dangers.

The framework makes the process comprehensible in its entirety, and when the different tasks all reinforce each other the power of the analogy can be overwhelming. Cognitive psychology too allows us to understand what analogies are capable of doing in terms of going beyond the available information and filling in for gaps in that information. On the other hand, analogies tend to fit incoming information into their mold: “Discrepant information tends to be slighted or ignored; ambiguous information tends to be interpreted as supporting the expectations of the analogy” (38). Foreign affair being what they are, the abuse of historical analogies will be more difficult to correct and check.; “the consequences are also likely to be more serious” (44).

Chapter 3

The U.S. Vietnam decisions could serve as a case study due to their substance and holding a least likely case for Khong's arguments. The analysis surveys both "why" and "how" questions: why the U.S. intervened in Vietnam and how it went about it. A successful explanation of the choice of methods (*i.e.*, "how") is at once an explanation of why the U.S. intervened and its intervention took the form it did.

Focusing on explanations of options has some advantages: it

- holds a prospect of a richer and more satisfying answer: why nonintervention was rejected and why among prointerventions one –or some—were chosen
- reflects the way policymakers actually make decisions in a world of options
- the choice of option may have crucial bearings on outcomes (success or defeat)
- “explaining the choice of options holds more promise of theoretical enrichment than merely explaining policy”

Explanations of options oppose the traditional explanations of Vietnam policy of the U.S., *e.g.*, containment or credibility theses.


Emphasis may be placed on the private, as opposed to the public, record of analogies among policymakers –though they most frequently coincide, *i.e.*, policymakers have no hesitation to make clear for their public audience (share/inform/explain/justify) the historical informative analogies affecting their decisionmaking.

Proof of the analogical reasoning theory: Options inconsistent with analogical lessons must be rejected. Among those basically consistent with the analogies lessons, those fully consistent with most, if not all, lessons are expected to be chosen.

Chapter 7

Dec. 1964-Feb. 1965
(Air War)

July 1965
(Ground War)



AE Framework:

1. Definition of situation: Aggression
2. Stakes: Vital
3. Implicit prescription: Intervene
4. Morally acceptable to intervene: Yes
5. Likelihood of success: Good
6. Dangers: Unspecified

(copied from Khong's Figure 7.1, "The Lessons of Munich and the Option Chosen")

Chapter Seven represents Khong's analysis of how the Munich Analogy was utilized to justify U.S. policy decisions with regard to Vietnam and Korea. The Lessons of Munich and the 1930's advanced Johnson's proposition that Diem had to avoid being a "Chamberlain" and instead be a "Churchill" in standing up to would-be aggressors.

1. Johnson, from an AE perspective, depicted Churchill as standing alone against the ascendancy of fascism, while
2. Rusk related the international crisis to his days at Oxford when "on the night in 1933 of the debate on the motion, 'that this house will not fight for king and country'....That motion passed. The motion was quoted by Hitler as an indication that Britain wouldn't fight and therefore his hands were free to pursue his ambitions."

Munich helped support the domino effect of communism, mainly that:

1. Failure to stop the Asian Dominoes from falling—with South Vietnam as the Czechoslovakia of the 1960's—would require the United States to fight communism later and under worse conditions
2. It would probably cause World War III.

3. South Vietnam would be the first victim of expansionist communism, just as the Sudetenland had first succumbed to fascism's advance.
4. The moral was simple: it was shameful and unwise for Chamberlain to appease Hitler; and the same moral applied to appeasing Ho Chi Minh and Mao Zedong.

The question becomes, "Why did Johnson not pursue Option E' above, if the image of protecting the Great Society did not fully come into play?"

Khong contends that the need to avoid provoking China, and its presumed ally the Soviet Union, into entering the Vietnam War was uppermost in the minds of Johnson and his advisers. The need to avoid another analogy, that of MacArthur's mistake in Korea, is a sentiment that Khong extracts from the documents of 1964 and 1965.

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Robert Jervis: "Political Implication of Loss Aversion"

in Barbara Farnham, ed. *Avoiding Losses/Taking Risks: Prospect Theory and International Conflict* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994, pp. 23-40)

* This article explains many international affairs, focusing on wars and conflicts among states based on "prospect theory." Based on this theory, states/leaders are usually much more concerned about their losses rather than their gains. Jervis continuously emphasizes the psychological reason, like "fear" of breaking the status quo, as a crucial variable for a state to determine its foreign policy.

Introduction

* Prospect theory: "People tend to be risk-averse for gains but simultaneously to be risk-acceptant for losses." (p.23) The peculiarity in this theory is that "the reference point-usually the status quo-is crucial"(p.23) to explain actors' behaviors. The theory pays more attention to psychological reason rather than rationality.

General effects of loss aversion

* Prospect theory (more psychological reason) shows better why people would persevere in losing their own property than rationality can explain it. (Based on Jervis's argument) Examples) the Vietnam War, the Ford administrations' reaction to the possibility of a swine flue epidemic (pp.26-27)

Effects on Bargaining, Deterrence, and Causes of War

* The responses of actors against losses are more various compared with against gains. These responses against losses can be also applied to the relations-conflicts and bargains-among states.

* Some implications. (pp. 28-29)

1) A state will be willing to pay higher price and run higher risks if it is facing losses than if it is seeking to make gains.

- 2) Coercion can more easily maintain the status quo than alter it.
- 3) Conflicts and wars are more likely when each side believes it is defending the status quo.
- 4) It can explain a superpower's threat to intervene in a local conflict during the Cold War.

War –Peace Decisions

* Historical evidences that “fear” caused or motivated the wars

Ex) Saddam Hussein's attack

Japan's attack toward Great Britain and the US

German motivation in 1914(In this case, the motivation was mixed with expansion)

Israel's 1967 war

* Some exceptions which “expansion” or “desires” provoked the wars or conflicts.

Ex) Hitler, Bismarck

Although there are some exceptional cases mentioned above, “fear of loss” can generally describe the causes of the wars and a preventive war

* In some cases, the different perception of the “reference point”, which the gap between the desired state of affairs and the current one can lead to high risk-taking.

Crisis Stability

Renormalization

* Renormalization

: The length of time it takes for actors to adjust to a new status quo.(p.35)

Implication for Social Efficiency and Stability

Methodological Difficulties

To evaluate the prospect theory, there are some methodological difficulties related to the *measuring variables and designing research model*. .

- 1) The endowment effect is difficult to verify because states and people in society are not given things like in labs
- 2) The measurement of the added valuation
- 3) Designing the framework for experiments. In reality, frameworks of international issues are constructed by actors themselves, not by other operators.
- 4) The measurement of the subjective utility of various outcomes

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Steve Rosen, “Emotions, Memory and Decision Making”
(Unpublished Manuscript).

Rosen questions the rationality assumption. His argument is that people make decisions not by comparing alternative expected outcomes, but by adopting a single course of action in a way that seems >obvious= and necessary to them given what they observe. In particular, people recall more quickly those patterns that were formed during a state of emotional arousal (emotion based pattern recognition). Conscious cognition is confined to a secondary role.

This is a descriptive theory of decision making. Rosen claims that emotion based pattern recognition (EBPR) leads to observable, external behavior that is different than that predicted by rational calculation: 1. The learning pathway, in terms of brain physiology, is different; 2. Emotion based memories predispose the actor towards broad *categories* of action, but do select detailed *courses* of action; 3. Decisions are taken very early on in the process, prior to (i) the need to decide, (ii) the arrival of relevant information; and (iii) the evaluation of alternative strategies; 4. Variation in individual behavior is the result of variation in experiences inducing emotional reactions; 5. individual behavior can become group behavior when groups of people had the same experience and reactions; 6. Individual memories of a dominant figure can be transformed into group behavior.

The argument is based on cognitive efficiency: Chunking or patterning is a way for the brain to conserve energy (eg. speech does not require letter-by-letter cognition). Through pattern recognition, processing time is radically reduced. Cognition (data processing) and awareness (consciousness) are not coextensive, but are related through the phenomena of selective memory retrieval (how do we recall information from long-term memory as a result of brain activity of which we are not aware?); data chunking (how do we connect pieces into patterns?); and implicit memory (how do we understand the unconscious/implicit kinds of memory?).

Evidence:

Memories created in the context of traumatic experiences (eg. Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) remain vivid. Physiologically, declarative (articulated) memories and PTSD memories are processed separately by the brain. In a lab, students remember stories with high level of emotional content better than those with low emotional content. The amygdala turns emotionally charged perceptions into memories. Patients with damage to the amygdala (part of the autonomous nervous system / ANS) fail to behave in accordance with to this process. Rosen argues that external cues may lead us to recall more easily those memories associated with a similar event when emotion forms part of the encoding process.

Crucial to Rosen's argument is the question of whether emotion *precedes* cognition: If emotional arousal followed cognition, then emotion would add little to our understanding of decision-making. I may avoid war simply because I have thought about the experiences of past wars, and learned what the costs of war are. Thus: (1) When does an emotional response occur?; and (2) Does it take place independently of conscious cognition?

Rosen points to mixed evidence on the primacy of emotion (eg. Zajonc-Lazarus debate, at 24-25), but cites animal research in support of the fact that fear operates through different physiological (synaptic) pathways than conscious thought (i.e. the thalamus-amygdala link operates twice as rapidly as the thalamus-cortex link, at 27). In humans, there is evidence that damage to the processes involving emotion-based memory encoding leads to >endless deliberation= among patients. Similarly, controlled blockage of the amygdala-ANS link in subjects resulted in a capacity to form long-term memories. Scientists have also confirmed the role of the amygdala in assessing facial expressions and their >codification= into memory.

If EBPR does have an impact, then where do policymakers= >historical lessons= come from? Rosen adds to Yuen Foong Khong=s conclusion that the >most readily available, superficially similar= analogies come to mind: The memories that will be invoked are those of external sensory inputs that were processed by the hippocampus at a time when the ANS was activated by the amygdala. Fear arousal, for example, will be recalled whether the new stimuli closely resemble the remembered, emotion-linked pattern or not. Rosen acknowledges that some processing of the current situation is left unspecified, but that the range of memories can be greatly narrowed because most leaders will not have had many experiences that aroused in them personally great fear. (36).

Gideon Rose has shown that negative historical experiences and emotions better predicted US war termination policy than bureaucratic interests, the balance of power, and domestic opinion. Dan Reiter demonstrated the explanatory power of learning in the context of the alliance behavior of small states. Thus, massive social violence or trauma can generate shared emotional experiences and memories, which can then determine state behavior. Rosen sets out some testable propositions:

1. EBPR leads to fast, early decisions, irrespective of the complexity of the problem or the availability of data.
2. These decisions are directly related to (conform to) past emotional experience; the pattern is one of >selecting away from= policies associated with the negative experience.
3. EBPR decisions will resist contradictory data.
4. They can be distinguished from other, more cognitive (non-emotional) decisions.

Rosen reviews 4 cases, including Roosevelt (Munich; reversal of US policy of non-involvement); Truman (Potsdam; T=s perception of Stalin congruent with his image of >trustworthy politician);

Kennedy (Cuba; decision to use (some kind of) force to remove missiles made earlier than necessary; non-consideration of *status quo*; K. favoring military action prior to Sep. 4 statements; learning experience at Vienna; personal challenge); Johnson (Vietnam - commitment of ground troops; decision made earlier than necessary; McNamara fact-finding missions were an effort to build consensus on a decision already taken; options to leave S. Vietnam not on the table; 1948 experience at Democratic convention; public statement that opponent was >soft on communism; personal challenge).

Is the hypothesis falsifiable? Yes, through >historical checks= (Eisenhower example) and >thought experiments.= Domestic regime type appears to be an intervening variable. Thought experiments may include the >wiring= of state leaders to determine whether emotional responses (as measured by changes in physiology) Adid or did not correlate with decision making time and conformity to past emotional experiences.@

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David Campbell, "Introduction: On Dangers and their Interpretations"
In Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity,
pp. 1-15

Campbell begins by looking at the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and asking why this was considered to be a danger to the United States. He observes that "danger is not an objective condition. It is not a thing that exists independently of those to whom it may become a threat." Instead, "danger is an effect of interpretation" (2). Interestingly, he notes that terrorism was not seen as a major danger to the US. The changed perceptions of the dangerousness of terrorism in the wake of Sept. 11 illustrates his point nicely. Danger results "from the calculations of a threat that objectifies events, disciplines relations, and sequesters an ideal of the identity of the people said to be at risk" (3).

Campbell argues that "contrary to the claims of epistemic realism ... as understanding involves rendering the unfamiliar in the terms of the familiar, there is always an ineluctable debt to interpretation such that there is nothing outside of discourse" (4). Rather than adopting the standard approach of narrative historiography, Campbell seeks to employ a "logic of interpretation that ... concerns itself with considering the manifest political consequences of adopting one mode of representation over another." (4). His approach is to ask "how certain terms and concepts have historically functioned within discourse" (6).

Based on this approach, Campbell suggests that a "a more radical response" to current dangers is needed – one that is "directed at the modes of interpretation that make these challenges available for apprehension, the strategies and tactics by which they are

calculated as dangers and the means by which they come to be other” (8). He seeks to understand “the roles that danger and difference play” in shaping the identity of the US.

Campbell then turns to a discussion of identity and state, observing that identity is not fixed, but rather is defined in relation to difference and other. This leads to a non-traditional definition of the state. Statehood is produced by “a discourse of primary and stable identity... which is constituted in time Through a stylized repetition of acts and achieved, not through a founding act, but rather a regulated process of repetition. (10). States are always in the “process of becoming” as they do not exist apart from the ongoing process of their creation. The “national state” is thus an “unavoidably paradoxical entity.”

The articulation of danger thus becomes not a “threat to the state’s identity” rather it is “a condition of possibility” (13.)