

Introduction: In this article, Putnam tries to answer the question, "how do domestic politics and international relations get entangled?" He rejects state-as-unitary-actor models and strong/weak-state models and tries to construct a two-level, win-set-based model while eyeing a general equilibrium theory for the interaction of domestic and international factors. This article provides only a basic sketch of the bargaining of international agreements, largely relying on the impact of the size of the win-set to constrain or enhance bargaining power and increase or decrease the likelihood of agreement. He does not offer a detailed model of domestic politics; instead he concentrates on a model with the negotiator as an honest agent with no independent motives.

The Setup: "At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments." Moves that are rational on one board may not be on the other; but a leader must negotiate a policy consistent on both boards. Failure at the international board may lead a player to topple it; failure at the domestic board may result in the leader being toppled. A leader is purely an agent with no personal motives in this model.

Sequential Model:

Level I: bargaining between negotiators, leading to a tentative agreement.

Level II: separate discussions within each group of constituents about whether to ratify the agreement. At this stage, the domestic groups can only vote up or down; any amendments require agreement from all other parties involved.

Win-Set:

A "win-set" for a given Level II constituency is the set of all possible Level I agreements that would gain the necessary majority among the constituents when voted up or down. The size of a win-set is important for two reasons. First, larger win-sets make Level I agreement more likely, *ceteris paribus*. The smaller the win-sets, the greater the risk of involuntary defection, and hence the more applicable the literature about dilemmas of collective action. Involuntary defection is when an agent is unable to deliver on a promise because of failed ratification, as distinguished from voluntary defection, which is when a rational egoist reneges on an unenforceable contract. Second, the relative size of the respective Level II win-sets will affect the distribution of the joint gains from the international bargain. A small domestic win-set can be a bargaining advantage.

Determinants of the Win-Set:

The size of the win-set depends on the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents.

-The lower the cost of no-agreement to constituents, the smaller the win-set. *Ceteris paribus*, more self-efficient states with smaller win-sets should make fewer international agreements and drive harder bargains in those that they do make. Small countries with open economies are more likely to have "internationalist" all-purpose support for international agreements.

-Issues can be (a) boundary disagreements (hawks v doves) or (b) factional disagreements (same point elicits comments of "too far" and "too little"). (a) raises the risk of involuntary defection. (b) may improve chances for cooperation by creating transnational alignments.

-The composition of the active Level II constituency affects the character of the win-set set. This composition is affected by variation in participation rates and the issue that is politicized.

-If you allow for transnational issue linkage, you create opportunities for side payments and iso-vote or "political indifference curves" (I can't recreate the picture here).

The size of the win-set depends on the Level II political institutions.

-Ratification procedures. The greater the autonomy of central decision-makers from their Level II constituents, the larger their win-set and thus the greater the likelihood of achieving international agreement; but *ceteris paribus*, the stronger a state is in terms of autonomy from domestic pressures, the weaker its relative bargaining position internationally.

The size of the win-set depends on the strategies of the Level I negotiators.

-Each negotiator wants to maximize the other side's win-set but not necessarily his own (increase likelihood of agreement, but lose bargaining position).

-If he wants to max his own win-set, he can use side-payments or generic goodwill. The two-level approach emphasizes that international side payments should be calculated in terms of its marginal contribution to the likelihood of ratification.

-To max the other side's win-set, negotiators will try to reinforce one another's standing with their respective constituents and hence expand their win-set.

Uncertainty and Bargaining Tactics

Level I negotiators often don't know what's going on Level II, particularly for the other side, because there are limits to gaining information and negotiators have incentives to understate their own win-sets. A negotiator seeks to convince the other side that his win-set is kinked (a given agreement will be in the win-set, but a slightly unfavorable alternative will not).

Restructuring and Reverberation

International pressures can "reverberate" within domestic politics, tipping the domestic balance and expanding the win-set. It could also create a domestic backlash and kill the deal, though this is less likely than positive reverberation.

The Role of the Chief Negotiator

Putnam now relaxes the assumption that the negotiator was an honest agent without independent policy views. He adds the following three motives to the negotiator, which implies that the negotiator has a veto over possible agreements. Even if Level II groups would approve of an agreement, it is unlikely to be concluded if the negotiator objects. But the leader's existing domestic coalition or the costs of building a new one may constrain his options.

1. Enhancing his standing in the Level II game by increasing his political resources or by minimizing potential losses.
2. Shifting the balance of power at Level II in favor of domestic policies that he prefers for exogenous reasons.
3. Pursue his own conception of the national interest in the international context.