
The claim that a global human rights polity exists is not to say that these norms have really altered government behavior. Three questions arise.

1. How much change have the norms caused in government behavior?
2. What kind of processes explain the change?
3. Why do human rights norms have an impact?

Summary of theoretical framework.
Norms matter; the question is which ideas, how and why. Human rights norms have become constitutive, defining what it is to be a state. Consequently rational bargaining is only one form of social interaction in the human rights discourse. Processes of argumentation and persuasion are important as are processes of domestic institutionalization. These processes are part of an overall process of socialization which takes place on four levels: between (i) norm-violating governments and the domestic society, (ii) the government and international human rights networks, (iii) the networks and international organizations and other states and (iv) all those in (iii) and the violating government. The authors develop a model to explain human rights norm embedding, called the “Spiral Model” which passes through several phases. First repression, which prevents all domestic opposition, then denial by the perpetrating state of accusations made by foreign groups. This is followed by tactical concessions, through which a vulnerable norm-violating government attempts to deflect criticism. The fourth stage begins when norms gain “prescriptive status” within the state. When the norms are fully embedded the state has reached the final stage, termed “rule-consistent behavior”.

Evaluation of findings
The authors make use of 11 case studies to test their theory. They find that the socialization process is widespread, and democratic consolidation is strongly associated with human rights progress. They find the cases fit well with their model. All eleven have moved through to at least the tactical concession phase, and all except Tunisia appear to be headed in the right direction. All forms of socialization occur, institutionalization in all cases, bargaining especially in the denial and concession phases and argumentative processes in later phases. 3 factors explain variation between cases: the presence of internal conflict which threatens the coherence of the state, the degree of social openness and the strength of the norms and regime globally at any time.

Alternative explanations
Both alternative accounts considered by the authors, one realist, the other focused on domestic factors, are discounted. The realist argument that states follow great power pressure is flawed because the evidence suggests the great powers follow the lead of transnational advocacy networks. The domestic argument, which centers on economic growth, is weak since there is little correlation between economic growth and progress on human rights.
Implications to larger debates
The findings have an impact on two current debates: (a) the domestic impact of international norms and (b) the nature of domestic social change. The authors find that their model of socialization of internalizing regimes addresses the question of how norms are internalized. They also argue that their work reinforces the idea that international ideas that share commonalities with domestic attitudes will come to be accepted domestically, and in fact shows how international norms and domestic ideas come to “fit together”.

Policy implications
The authors list ten policy implications.
1. Transnational advocacy works
2. Transnational networks are not sufficient. They must be complemented by domestic mobilization.
3. Indirect effects that force governments to make concessions are also useful
4. Different methods work best at different points of the process.
5. Argument and shaming is effective
6. International law matters to provide the prescriptive forms that states can adhere to.
7. Human rights need the rule of law, consequently effective states, not their overthrow are required.
8. Consistent application of pressure is necessary. Variation can be taken as a lack of resolve
9. Sanctions can help drive a state to the tactical concession phase, but can be counter-productive in later phases.
10. "Constructive engagement" should only be used in later phases. Earlier it will be seen as weakness.