

**Bruce Russett, John Oneal, and David R. Davis, “The Third Leg of the Kantian Tripod for Peace: International Organizations and Militarized Disputes, 1950-1985.”**

Along with republican constitutions and commercial interdependence, Kant’s formula for perpetual peace mandated an international law that could provide the framework for nonmilitary resolution of conflict. Russett, Oneal, and Davis (ROD) postulate that a sufficiently dense network of international governmental organization (IGO) membership comprises such a legal framework, and that there has been enough regional and intertemporal variation in the density of such networks to produce testable hypotheses of their effects on military conflict.

Theoretically, IGOs directly reduce military conflict in six ways: they coerce norm-breakers, mediate conflicts, reduce the costs of information-gathering, promote expectations of mutual gain, socialize norms, and create a sense of community. Further, there are indirect effects of IGO membership reinforcing Kant’s other two prerequisites for peace. . .indeed, although they undertake a test of it, ROD acknowledge issues of “causation” cannot be firmly established between IGO membership and conflict reduction.

In their statistical analysis, ROD find that IGOs have the expected effect on conflict, at least for the period from 1950-85. In a follow-up regression, the authors detect the reverse effect as well (though to a lesser degree), suggesting that common IGO membership and peace could be mutually reinforcing. This is used to justify the conclusion that each of Kant’s requirements has an independent effect in reducing military conflict among states.