Week 5 Summaries
Peter Alexis Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed," International
Organization 32:4 (Autumn, 1978), pp. 881-912.
Quoting (911): "The relationship among the three parts of this
paper may be summarized as follows: The international system is
not only a
consequence of domestic politics and structures but a cause of
them. Economic relations and military pressures constrain an entire
domestic behaviors, from policy decisions to political forms.
International relations and domestic politics are therefore so
interrelated that they should be analyzed simultaneously, as wholes."
Motivating this article are two tendencies: (1) "Most of the literature
concerned with the interaction of the international system and domestic
structure is authored by writers with international concerns, and that
literature therefore primarily looks at the arrows that flow from domestic
structure toward international relations"; and (2) "A comparativist often
seeks to explain the nature of the domestic structure To answer
such questions, the international system may itself become an explanatory
variable. Instead of being a cause of international politics, domestic
structure may be a consequence of it. International systems, too,
become causes instead of consequences." (882)
The substance of the article focuses on the position of the comparativist
and proceeds in three stages. First, in the longest and most substantive
section, it argues that there are a number of theories in international
relations and political theory, which claim that domestic politics are
shaped by international systems. These theories focus primarily on
war and economics as mediators. Second, it argues that 'the domestic structure'
is often too casually supposed as a sufficiently informative representation
of a given nation. This argument is supported by a discussion of
'strong state' and 'weak state' as causes of international political behavior.
The author thinks that this distinction tends to hide more important causes
in the domestic political situation. Third and finally, it points
out the presence of a 'consciousness' in the literature that an fluid
exchange between international and domestic politics is not just a product
of the contemporary world, but it an important fact of political history.
Robert O. Keohane and Helen V. Milner, eds., Internationalization
and Domestic Politics New York: Cambridge University Press,
1996. Chapters 1-3, 5, 7. (pp. 3-75, 108-136, 159-185)
Helen V. Milner and Robert O. Keohane, "Internationalization and
Domestic Politics: An Introduction" (Chapter 1) and Jeffrey A. Frieden and
Ronald Rogowski, "The Impact of the International Eocnomy on National Policies:
An Analytical Overview" (Chapter 2).
is “the process generated by underlying shifts in transaction costs that
produce observable flows of goods, services, and capital” (4). Increases
in these flows reflect the decreasing costs (or increasing benefits) of
international transactions relative to national transactions. Causes
for this include decreases in transportation costs, improved physical and
informational infrastructure, deregulation of capital markets and finance,
increasing use of production processes characterized by economies of scale,
Since this “exogenous easing
of international exchange” (3) is not easily observable, internationalization
is measured by its effects - the proportional growth of international flows
to domestic ones. In this book, internalization is treated as the major
causal variable. Dependent variables are: 1) policy preferences of
domestic agents towards national policies and institutions and patterns of
preference aggregation, 2) given these preferences, changes in national policy
and institutions themselves, and 3) given preferences, policies, and institutions,
the relationship between institutions and policy outcomes.
affects domestic policy preferences through changes in relative prices
of domestic goods and factors of production. Two types of relative
price movements are relevant: 1) price convergence caused by an exogenous
decrease in trade barriers and 2) price shocks caused by exogenous changes
in supply or demand for a good.
Aggregate Welfare Effects
in costs of trade lead to expansion of tradables sector of the domestic
economy, which spells greater effect of global market trends on domestic
economies of all states, including autarchies. Thus, internationalization
leads to intensification of domestic actors’ preferences over economic
foreign policy. Also, with the rise of economic pressure for price
convergence, negative effects of trade barriers on aggregate welfare rise.
This is because the larger the gap between the world market prices and
the domestic prices in the protected economy, the larger the deadweight
cost to social welfare. This cost is associated with investments
in non-competitive protected enterprises. Besides these “static
efficiency costs of closure,” there are “dynamic costs”, which include
reduced incentives to adopt new technologies and a general decline in efficiency
of factor use (33). The authors (Frieden and Rogowski) draw the following
hypotheses: internal pressures to liberalize increase with internationalization,
and these pressures are increasing in the degree to which the economy is
closed and in the degree to which potential gains from trade exist.
Price shocks change a country’s terms of trade (Export price / Import
price ratio). When terms of trade improve, pressures to liberalize
rise because of the increased social welfare cost of protection.
Conversely, when terms of trade decline, pressures for closure increase.
Internationalization causes fluctuations in terms of trade to have greater
effect on aggregate welfare; therefore, the relationship between price
shocks and policy preferences grows stronger with internationalization.
Effects on domestic groups
favors exporters, importers, and consumers of imported good and hurts
import-competers. Generally, those whose products are in line with
a country’s comparative advantage will benefit (become exporters); the
reverse is true. There are three perspectives on how domestic interests
will respond to internationalization.
Heckshner-Ohlin / Stolper-Samuelson. Factors are assumed to be
mobile across sectors. A country will export abundant-factor intensive
goods and import scarce-factor intensive goods. Returns rise to owners
of factors that are intensive in the production of a good whose price rises,
and the increase in returns is greater than the increase in price.
Conversely, returns fall to owners of factors that are intensive in the production
of a good whose price falls, and the decrease in returns is greater than
the decrease in price. Because internationalization raises prices of
abundant-factor intensive goods and lowers prices of scarce-factor intensive
goods, abundant factors benefit, and scarce factors lose. Thus, internationalization
intensifies conflict along factor lines.
Ricardo-Viner. Some factors are assumed to be sector-specific.
This means that 1) pressure for liberalization will vary with factor specificity,
2) competitive sectors benefit, non-competitive sectors lose, 3) conflict
will manifest itself along sector lines.
Economies of scale and total factor productivity. Internationalization
benefits firms with economies of scale, firms with existing networks of
international trade partners, and firms that are generally more experienced
in the international markets. Firms and industries that lack these
qualities will lose.
As well as
price convergence, particular price shocks affect domestic group preferences.
For example, resource booms can result in a “Dutch Disease.” A rise
in a price of natural resources spells higher income to those in that
sector, which causes demand for and, subsequently, the price of non-tradables
to rise. This means that the costs of inputs into the non-booming
tradables sector rise, and they become non-competitive. Thus, ceteris
paribus, exporters and producers of non-tradables win, producers of non-booming
In much of the analysis above,
Frieden and Rogowski use trade to illustrate internalization effects,
since movement of capital produces shifts in preferences that are very
similar. Nevertheless, Keohane and Milner note that the increase
in capital movement has been much greater than that in trade, and that
the two produce effects on different dimensions. Increases in capital
mobility lead to “smoother consumption” and more volatile investment,
while increases in good mobility lead to output volatility (15).
It’s important to realize that
a country’s response to internationalization is not strictly a function
of its effects on relative prices and, consequently, on policy preferences
of domestic actors. Other factors, such as partisanship, level of
labor organization, and institutions shape outcomes too.
Implications for Government Policy
As noted above, internalization makes domestic economies more sensitive
to world market trends. Thus, the likelihood of domestic policy and
institutional reforms will increase with internalization.
Internalization (specifically, increased capital mobility) undermines
the autonomy and efficacy of government macroeconomic policy. Left
wing governments who favor expansionary monetary and fiscal policy will
be more constrained than the right-wing governments who favor price-stability.
Two additional hypotheses follow:
1) As stated
above, internalization will affect all countries, including autarchies.
This is because changing opportunity costs, not increases in capital or
trade flows per se, affect policy preferences.
makes capital more powerful relative to labor and politicians. This
is because capital is more mobile and can employ a credible threat to
exit in order to extract rents.
It should be clear that governments may resist pressures to liberalize
even in the presence of potential gains to aggregate welfare, since these
can be offset by concentrated costs, long-term social dividends, or short-term
pain. Some institutional arrangements can make politicians internalize
aggregate social welfare and, therefore, are more receptive to internationalization
pressures. Three institutional features are relevant:
Breadth of constituency. Liberalization is easier when constituencies
are broad: 1) under democratic regimes, 2) when the number of constituencies
is small, 3) when partisan fragmentation is low.
Credibility. Liberalization is easier when governments can
credibly commit to direct compensatory transfers to the potential losers.
Time horizons. Liberalization is easier when politicians’ time
horizons are longer: 1) long cabinet life, 2) fixed terms of office and
stable majorities, 3) insulated decision-makers
Other institutional arrangements can enable potential losers to block
the effects of internationalization or to limit access of potential winners
to policy-making. Such institutions can 1) obscure interest formation
by blocking price signals from international economy to the domestic one
(relevant in autarchies), 2) freeze existing policies and coalitions, or
3) influence leaders’ choices.
Geoffrey Garrett and Peter Lange, "Internationalization, Institutions,
and Political Change" (Chapter 3).
To illustrate institutional effects on policy and institutional change,
the authors use a model of an economy with two sectors: tradables and non-tradables.
There are two time periods, and tradables expand (e.g. due to internationalization)
in the second period. Institutions aside, there should be a decline
in “Keynesian welfare state policies” that favor non-tradables. The
government is concerned with office retention through 1) redistribution
to core constituency and 2) broadening its core constituency by pursuing
favorable macroeconomic policy. Redistribution concerns dominate concerns
about aggregate social welfare.
There are two types of institutions
in every society. The first type, socioeconomic institutions, direct
organization of interests in the private sector. They affect the
types of redistributional demands by domestic groups and influence the
macroeconomic constraints under which governments operate. Labor
market institutions belong to this type. The authors show that following
the expansion of the tradables sector, both very weak labor market institutions
and strong, centralized labor market institutions will allow countries
to take advantage of increased trade, and make it easier for governments
to follow liberalization policies. The former will be unable to stop
growing economic pressures for liberalization. The latter, because
they are centralized, will internalize costs of protection, and will favor
liberalization with compensation to labor in the non-tradables sector.
On the other hand, when labor market institutions are strong but decentralized,
redistributional pressures by unions in the non-tradables sector will be
powerful. Liberalization will be strongly opposed, and economic performance
The second type, formal political
institutions, aggregate interests in the public arena. Keynesian welfare
policies will decrease and liberalization increase when the following institutional
characteristics apply (this is partly a restatement of, and an elaboration
on, institutional section from Chs 1 and 2):
Government is responsive to new growing policy demands (i.e. institutions
Electoral bias against economically powerful sector is minimized (i.e.
there are few small, institutionally privileged groups; e.g. agriculture
in the US is institutionally privileged through geographic representation
in the Senate). Proportional representation is the best for this.
There are few veto points – the government is highly responsive to changing
The central bank is independent from the government (promoting competitive
behavior in the tradables sector).
The authors note that a political economy system that meets all these
conditions (plus weak labor markets) does not exist. But when few
of these conditions are met, there exist strong incentives for governments
to engage in institutional change in order to strengthen the position of
the tradables sector and improve macroeconomic conditions. From their
model, the authors derive the following predictions: a government is more
likely to undertake institutional change 1) the less risk-averse it is, 2)
the longer its guaranteed terms of office, and 3) the more favorable the conditions
of international economy. This is based on the fact that institutional
reform brings short-term losses but long-term gains to the government’s utility
(graph on 71).
Jeffry A. Frieden, "Economic Integration and the Politics of Monetary
Policy in the United States" (Chapter 5).
Frieden explores the link between
international economic integration and political importance of monetary
policy. In a closed economy, monetary policy affects nominal
prices, and so it involves broad macroeconomic aggregates (e.g. growth
and unemployment). Few groups exist with intense preferences over
monetary policies: industries that borrow capital (e.g. housing) favor
loose policies, creditors (i.e. financial sector) favor tight policies.
In an open economy, on the other
hand, monetary policy affects relative prices, since domestic interest
rates and prices of tradable goods now depend on world markets. Therefore,
monetary policy has a direct effect on the exchange rate. Tradables
producers favor loose policies, non-tradables producers favor tight policies.
In addition, internationally oriented firms favor fixed exchange
rates, while producers of non-tradables and import-competers favor floating
exchange rates. In an open economy, monetary policy involves
more concentrated and defined economic interests and so is expected to
be of greater sociopolitical importance than it is in a closed economy.
Frieden also suggests that in a closed American economy the President should
be more concerned with monetary policy than the Senate, while the converse
should hold in an open economy. This is because the President has
a broad constituency and, therefore, has incentives to focus on issues
of aggregate economic concern. In a closed economy, again, these
are affected by the monetary policy. Members of Congress, on the
other hand, have geographically concentrated constituencies and are more
susceptible to pressures by specific groups. Additionally,
in an open economy, monetary and trade policies are potential substitutes,
since the exchange rate is affected. Frieden examines three periods
in the US history and shows how changes in openness of the economy were
accompanied, as predicted, by changes in the political prominence, political
cleavages, and Congressional activity associated with the making of monetary
Matthew Evangelista, "Stalin's Revenge: Institutional Barriers
to Internationalization in the Soviet Union" (Chapter 7).
Institutions of the USSR blocked
price signals from international economy thereby obscuring formation of
preferences consistent with Frieden and Rogowski’s analysis in ch2.
The two main institutions that played that role were the state monopoly
on foreign trade and the “administrative-command system” of central planning.
In addition, “democratic centralism” or nomenklatura system of appointments
at all levels of administration ensured that even if preferences were recognized,
they could not be acted upon.
However, may have been three
indirect ways, through which internationalization impacted the Soviet
and the budget deficit. A simplified picture: the USSR exported
oil and imported bread. In the 80s, the price of oil collapsed and
the price of bread rose on the international markets – the terms of trade
declined. This prompted increases in government subsidies and foreign
debt, which led to inflation and budget deficits.
reformist coalition. Isolation from international competition
produced technological stagnation, which would induce competent managers,
apparatchiks, and intelligentsia to demand more openness, and these demands
would be further fueled by increasing internationalization.
loss of Eastern Europe. During the 1970s, when the price of oil was
high on world markets, the USSR sold oil to its satellites at depressed
prices thereby enduring opportunity costs for not selling it at full price.
This also made the Eastern European economies dependent on cheap oil.
When, in the 80s, the price of oil fell, the subsidies decreased.
This weakened the communist regimes and allowed for formations of pro-Western
each of the above arguments, the author noted that the relationship between
the world economy and the described changes could have been spurious.
None of these discussions completely conformed to Frieden and Rogowski’s
The author then goes on to show, using the case of the energy sector,
how the Soviet institutions intervened, and how their legacy continues
to intervene, in the preference and strategy formation of the actors in
Jeffry A. Frieden, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic
Policies in a World of Global Finance,” International Organization
45:4 (Autumn 1991), pp. 425-51.
High international capital mobility of capital is a salient feature of the
contemporary international economy. In this article, Frieden proposes a framework
to analyze the politics of international capital mobility focusing on distributional
implications of (a) cross-border capital movements and (b) domestic economic
policies. Friden argues that (1) Although financial capital is extremely
mobile, other sector-specific capital and equities are far less mobile, and
national economic policies still work (2a) In the long run, international
financial integration tends to favor capital over labor in developed countries
(2b) In the shorter run, financial integration favors capitalists with mobile/diversified
assets and disfavors ones with assets tied to specific locations and activities
in developed countries (3) international capital mobility remake new political
division such as producers of tradable goods vs. producers of nontradable
goods, internationally diversified investors vs. undiversified investors.
Although international capital mobility is impressive, borders and currencies
are still substantial barriers to investment flows because of (1) country/currency
risk (2) different forms of capital have different mobilities (bonds and
bank claims have near perfect mobility compared to equities and other non-financial
assets such as knowledge). If capital is specific to location, increased
financial integration has only limited effects on sector-specific policies.
But integration of financial markets has significant effects on the effectiveness
and distributional impact of national macro-economic policies. Under full
capital mobility condition, national economic policy (monetary/fiscal) cannot
affect the national interest rate; it can only affect the exchange rate,
and economic policies operate via exchange rate, not interest rate. And this
has a different distributional effects compared to the world without capital
In long term, capital mobility generally increases political influence of
owners of financial assets because they can invest anywhere with higher returns.
An distributional implication is a possible conflict between [owners/managers
of financial assets and the multinational corporations (MNSc) who gains from
financial integration] and [owners/managers of the specific-factors (production
factors that cannot be transferred to another industry/location in a short
term) who loses from financial integration].
A trade-off between national macroeconomic policy autonomy and exchange rate
stability has developed, with international investors/traders more willing
to give up (monetary policy) autonomy for (exchange rate) stability, and
nontradables and domestically oriented sectors are interested in autonomy
than exchange rates. Producers of tradable goods prefer monetary expansion
(and depreciation) while international investors and producers of nontradable
goods prefer monetary contraction (and appreciation). Economic policy coordination
is important both in domestic and international level, and those for whom
overseas economic conditions are more relevant (international investors/traders,
and producers of tradable goods) will favor more coordinated policies (and
thus a surrender of more national policy autonomy) than those for whom domestic
conditions are determinant.
Ronald Rogowski, “Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade,”
American Political Science Review 81:4 (December 1987), pp. 1121-38.
Rogowski proposes a hypothesis that explains the impact of externally induced
changes in international trade – in countries with different factor endowments
– on varying patterns of political cleavage. Accordingly, changes in countries’
exposure to trade (the independent variable) should help explain why countries
have the political cleavages they do and why those change (the dependent
variable). In proposing this hypothesis, Rogowski acknowledges the importance
of other variables (such as ancient cultural and religious loyalties, wars
and migrations, or historical memories as the French Revolution) in explaining
varying patterns of political cleavages but complements them with an additional
variable that, so far, has been less noticed in this context.
Rogowski argues that the basic results of the theory of international trade
– including in particular the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem – imply that increases
or decreases in the costs and difficulty of international trade should powerfully
affect domestic political cleavages. Such effects would vary but yet remain
predictable depending on the factor endowments of each country. To examine
his hypothesis, Rogowski conducts “a more systematic, if still sketchy”
and non-conclusive review of the historical evidence. Four periods of global
change in exposure to trade are examined (namely, the “long” 16th century,
the 19th century, the depression of the 1930s, and the years since WW2) and
patterns of cleavages in specific countries are compared in view of their
According to the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem, in any society, protection
benefits – and liberalization of trade harms – owners of factors in which
that society is poorly endowed relative to the rest of the world. Similarly,
producers who use the scarce factors will benefit (in case of protection).
The opposite is also true, protection harms – and liberalization benefits
– the owners of factors that are abundantly available. Rogowski notes that
exogenous changes can have the same effects as an increase or decrease in
protection. For instance, changes in tariff policies should have a similar
effect as changes in transportation costs. Hence as a result of global exogenous
changes that increase international trade (such as cheaper transportation,
availability of super-tankers and cheap oil), owners and intensive employers
of locally abundant factors must have benefited economically. At the same
time, intensive employers of locally scarce factors must have been harmed
economically. Once the economic impact of such changes is established, Rogowski
develops a model that will help predict the political consequences of those
shifts in wealth and income.
Politically, Rogowski assumes that: (1) the beneficiaries of a change will
try to accelerate it (e.g. will seek to expand free trade) and vice versa;
(2) those that enjoy a sudden increase in wealth will thereby be enabled
to expand their political influence. Economically, Rogowski adopts the following
assumptions: (1) a 3-factor economy (land, labor, and capital); (2) the
land/labor ratio fully informs us about the any country’s endowment of those
two factors (i.e. no one country can be rich in both factors: a high land-labor
ratio implies abundance of land and scarcity of labor); (3) an advanced
economy is one in which capital is abundant. Thus, the model recognizes
four types of economies based on two variables: capital rich/poor and high/low
Rogowski hypothesizes that combining the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem with
the above model implies that increasing exposure to trade would result in
urban-rural conflict in two kinds of economies and in class conflict in the
two others. For instance, in an advanced economy (and therefore capital-rich)
endowed abundantly in labor but poorly in land, an expansion of trade will
benefit the owners of capital and labor (capitalists and workers) and will
harm the land-owners and the pastoral and agricultural enterprises that use
land intensively. Thus, we would expect capitalist and workers to support
pro-trade policies and to work in concert to increase their political influence.
This would bring about an urban-rural conflict.
According to the same logic, an urban-rural conflict is expected to result
from an increase in international trade in a labor-poor and backward economy
(i.e. where both labor and capital are scarce). Accordingly, when trade
expands capitalists and workers are harmed and will seek protection. Rogowski
demonstrates this using an example from the US in the 19th century (and
specifically in the debates of the 1896 presidential campaign). Since in
the 19th century US labor and capital were scarce, the theory correctly
predicts an urban-rural conflict with the agrarians assuming the free-trading
In a similar way, Rogowski demonstrates the plausibility of his theory
by using examples from 19th century Germany (poor in capital and rich in
labor and therefore prone to class conflict) and from 19th century Britain
(rich in capital and poor in land and therefore prone to rural-urban conflict).
Rogowski suggests that this theory may have further implications. More
specifically, it can be utilized to improve our understanding of three historical
riddles or conjectures. Two of these include: (1) an observation that among
labor-rich economies the state is expected to have a stronger role when
development follows a significant exposure to trade (by contrast, in an economy
that has accumulated abundant capital before it is opened to trade, capital
and labor will operate in relative harmony and little state intervention
will be required). (2) Why is there no socialism in the US? According to
Rogowski: since the US is a land rich economy it does not lend itself to
pro-labor political movements that are not expected to prosper when trade
is rising and labor is scarce.
Rogowski presents three possible objections to his theory: (1) the political
effects described in the model will not apply in countries that depend only
slightly on trade; (2) the cleavages should not persist since people would
quickly disinvest from losing factors and enterprises; (3) the theory does
not predict the outcome of these theories just that they will exist. Rogowski
addresses the first two objections and accepts the 3rd. Namely, that his
model indeed predicts cleavages and not their outcomes.
Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil
Society Targets Land Mines.," International Organization
52:3 (1998), pp. 613-644.
To set the stage, Price begins by explaining why the predominant theories
of international relations have difficulty accounting for crucial developments
in the effort to ban land mines (an international effort that took place throughout
the 1990s): (1) Realist theories expect states to base their decisions on
considerations of utility. However, in fact, many states have decided that
the military utility of land mines is outweighed by their humanitarian costs
(thus incorporating a moral dimension to the definition of the national interest).
(2) Neo-liberal approaches assume that international agreements are reached
thru a bargaining process between state interests that are internally derived.
Such approaches do not properly account for state interests that result from
normative changes that are initiated by non-state actors. (3) Constructivist
approaches to date (i.e. 1998) focused solely on the state as an actor and
paid less attention to other sources of socialization that have been important
in generating norms in a variety of issue areas. At the same time, constructivist
scholars who investigated the role of non-state actors in generating international
norms (and in defining state interests) have typically focused on non-security
issues such as human rights and the environment.
Price attempts to bridge the above gap (in the works of constructivist scholars)
by examining the processes by which members of a transnational civil society
(which is defined as a set of interactions within an imagined community that
is not confined to the territorial and institutional spaces of states) seek
to change the security policies of states thru the generation of international
norms that shape and redefine state interests. After relying on works of constructivist
scholars who have demonstrated that states are socialized to norms, Price
decides to analyze how a socialization process occurs (using the campaign
to ban land mines as a case study). The broader implication of such an analysis,
according to Price, is that it can help address some of the charges made
against the early constructivist literature. Namely, that it does not adequately
explain why some norms are accepted by some states and not by others and
why some norms fail.
In describing the socialization process of new international norms, Price
argues that the roles of moral persuasion and social pressure (that arises
from identity politics and emulation) are particularly crucial in understanding
the mechanisms of the generation of a new norm proscribing AP land mines.
Accordingly, in speculating about the impetus for an international norm change
fostered by transnational civil society, Price traces two processes of norm
adoption: (1) thru moral entrepreneurship; (2) thru emulation.
After singling out the two above norm adoption processes, Price examines
in detail the land mine prohibition campaign and identifies four pedagogical
techniques that have been used. The techniques are: (1) Issue generation by
information dissemination: Price maintains that international organizations
succeeded in identifying and politicizing the situation as a crisis issue
on state agendas. The establishment of the perception of a crisis, Price
quotes other IR scholars, was crucial in precipitating ideational or normative
change. (2) Establishment of networks: Networking with political officials
in governments and international organizations enabled to connect local agenda
to the interstate agenda. Moreover, the global web of electronic media (enabled
by the technological advances in telecommunications) allowed activists to
establish networks among themselves and to expedite the global dissemination
of information towards the common goals. (3) Grafting of a new norm onto
existing norms: Ensuring that the new norm will resonate with already established
norms was critical in the effort to de-legitimize the use of land mines.
More specifically, an attempt was made to establish moral parallels with
other practices of warfare that have already been de-legitimized (e.g., the
use of chemical weapons). (4) Reversing of the burden of proof: By credibly
questioning the military utility of land mines, the activists succeeded in
placing states on the defensive and in forcing them to publicly justify their
positions. Furthermore, after reaching the “tipping point” (which consisted
of a critical mass of states and of critical states adopting the ban), the
technique of shaming to induce norm adoption was readily employed.
Price concludes that transnational civil society can exist not only as a
community of political engagement in world politics, but it can also have
a meaningful impact, acting thru networks, in teaching governments what is
appropriate to pursue in politics.
Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy
Networks in International Politics, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1998. Chs. 1 & 3
This chapter sets out to define key terms and state theoretical foundations
and implications of transnational advocacy networks (TANs).
Networks are “forms of organization characterized by voluntary, reciprocal,
and horizontal patterns of communication and exchange.” (8) Transnational
advocacy networks (TANs) are networks of activists motivated by principled
ideas or values. They are communicative structures, which make the
strategic use of information in order to create and implement new ideas,
norms, and discourses. By so doing, they help to transform the practice
of national sovereignty by making territorial boundaries more porous.
TANs emerge for three reasons. First, channels between domestic groups
and their governments may be blocked, or such channels are no longer effective.
Secondly, activists believe that networks and their activities will promote
their personally held goals and missions. Thirdly, the existence of
international contact is extensive as to create arenas of forming and strengthening
Moreover, they employ four kinds of strategies to achieve their goals.
One is information politics to generate and move politically usable information
to where it will be most useful. Two, symbolic politics of employing
symbols, actions or stories that make sense of a situation for an audience
far away. Three, TANs engage in leverage politics of calling upon
governments and other international actors to affect the negligible situation.
And lastly, they engage in accountability politics of holding powerful actors
to their previously stated policies or principles. Their aim is to
persuade, socialize and pressure international actors to adopt certain kinds
of norms and values. What is important here is the construction of
appropriate and strategic cognitive frames, which impacts frame resonance
and hence the success of advocacy activities.
The likelihood of success of TANs depends on two factors: issue characteristics
and actor characteristics. TANs are most likely to succeed if the
issues regarding physical harm to the vulnerable and legal equality, and
if there exist dense networks with strong connection and reliable information
flow between them.
The most significant implication of the study of TANs are that norms matter:
They matter because they constrain the behavior of international actors
such as states. Since norms are embedded in social structures and
represent a shared set of understandings and expectations as to what is
appropriate behavior, changes in these practices and understandings should
in turn transform the norms themselves.
Ch 3: Human Rights Advocacy Networks in Latin America
In this chapter, Keck and Sikkink attempt to show that international human
rights pressures can lead to changes in human rights practices. The
emphasis is on the role of human agency and NGOs in making human rights
issues salient from the emergence of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights to pressuring violator states to respect human rights. The
combined forces of INGOs (international NGOs), NGOs, IOs (intergovernmental
organizations) such as the human rights bodies of the UN, and Foundations
and Funders enabled the human rights activists to share information with
one another and operate effectively.
The authors then examine the cases studies of Argentina and Mexico, in
order to show that the governments’ human rights policies have emerged as
a response to pressure from organizations in the human rights network.
In the case of Argentina, the human rights documentation provided by Amnesty
International and other NGOs even formed the basis of early US action on
Argentina, with respect to the issue of human rights violations in Argentina.
Furthermore, by developing significant external contacts with INGOs and
IOs, the TANs were better able to publicize the human rights situation, to
fund their activities, and to create international pressure on the Argentine
government in addition to domestic pressure, forcing the government to move
from initial refusal to the acceptance of international human rights interventions.
In the case of Mexico, TANs did not exist between 1968-9, provoking no
international pressure on the human rights violations in the country.
The emergence of TANs from 1970 to 1988 did not focus on Mexico as a problem
case, and hence the violations continued. But from 1988 to 1994, the
international network in collaboration with domestic NGOs provoked a rapid
and forceful response from the Mexican government, contributing a decline
in human rights vilations.
What the case studies suggest is that the existence and the activities
of TANs were a necessary but not sufficient condition for changing human
rights practices. “The vulnerability of the target state is thus [another]
key factor in network effectiveness.” (117) The key aspect of target
vulnerability is the availability of leverage, both in military and economic
terms. But more than that, it is the “combination of moral and material
pressure that leads to change. Transforming state practices has come
about linking principled ideas to material goals.” (118)
The overall conclusion is that “effective human rights networking does
not imply a simple victory of norms over interests. The networks were
influential within states because they helped to shape a reformulation of
how national interest was understood at times when global events were calling
into question traditional understandings of sovereignty and national interest.”
Lars-Erik Cederman, "Modeling the Democratic Peace as a Kantian Process",
Journal of Conflict Resolution 45:4 (August 2001), pp. 470-502.
Most of the democratic peace literature seeks to explain the democratic
peace as a constant law holding at a dyadic state level. However, Kant's
original theory of perpetual peace is based not only on democracies
never going to war, but an emergent macroprocess from three causal mechanisms:
strategic tagging (democratic regimes recognize other democracies and do not
attack them), regime-sensitive alliances (threat perceptions that determine
alliance are based not only on power, but on threat perceptions, and democracies
are no threat to democracies), and liberal collective security (whenever a
democracy is attacked, all democracies neighboring the autocratic aggressor
attack that aggressor). Rather than explain the democratic peace, this study
focuses on the consequences of the democratic peace by taking it as the assumption.
However, because history cannot be rerun in multiple tests, a computational
model is ideal for theoretically exploring the different possibillities
from multiple runs of history with democratic peace assumptions.
Cederman constructs a program in which rational expansionist states fight
each other with a grim trigger strategy (if attacked, fight to the death)
for territory in their expansionist drives. Each of 225 states originally
occupies a single square of a 15x15 grid, which for the states is the world.
He varies the starting population of democratic states among autocratic
states as anywhere between 0% and 100%. Each state defends each of
its borders by dividing a fixed amount of resources (troops) between its
borders, based power. The model is run for 1000 iterations, during each
of which each state has the opportunity to attack its neighbors with some
Because of strategic tagging, if the state is a democracy and borders
on other democracies, it need not allocate any troops to that border (like
the Canada-US border). Because of regime-dependent alliances, democracies
know that they need not balance against other democracies, freeing them
to balance against autocracies. Because of the collective security regime
for democracies, attacks against aggressive autocracies are coordinated
and simultaneous. These mechanisms give democracies an advantage over autocracies,
whose democratic flanks are not protected by ideology. In general,
the percentage of democracies given at the first iteration has an exponentially
positive effect on the percentage of democracies at the 1000th iteration.
The model vindicates Kant's original theory in that it is indeed possible
to grow the democratic peace in very inhospitable environments (490).
Hendrik Spruyt. The Sovereign State and its Competitors. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994. Chapter 8: “The Victory of the Sovereign
Spruyt considers the question: “What happened in the three centuries
preceding Westphalia that allowed sovereign states to become the constitutive
elements of the global state system?” (p. 154) Spruyt argues
that sovereign states (such as France) beat out city-state leagues
(like the Hansa) because sovereign, territorial states were “more effective
and more efficient in curtailing freeriding and defection, and hence
they were better at mobilizing the resources of their societies.”
Spruyt first considers the problems with this proposition in
the context of a “Darwinian” selection mechanism through war.
Spruyt extends the conventional literature of interstate competition
to consider whether the “success between dislike units be explained
by success in war.” (p. 156) He identifies two variants to
this argument: the efficacy (in terms of ability to raise revenue and
trained troops) of the sovereign state versus the feudal mode of organization
(which he rejects because the city-leagues enjoyed similar advantages);
and the efficacy of the sovereign state against the city-leagues (which
he rejects because city-states in this period had greater revenues than
the states). Thus, Spruyt rejects the hypothesis that sovereign
states beat the city-leagues because they had more land, more money, and
were thus able to raise larger and better armies. He points out
that although many member towns of the Hansa were devastated by the Thirty
Years War, “it was not the war that led to the demise of the Hansa.”
Spruyt instead argues for Darwinian selection through three mechanisms:
1) Survival of the fittest, in terms of standardization
of weights and measures, standardization of coinage, tariff-free trading
areas, binding regulation of trade, and an internal juridical hierarchy.
While the sovereign state could provide all of these things, the city-leagues
struggled to reduce transaction costs and other barriers to trade due
to the strong vestigal autonomy of its members.
2) Mutual empowerment, in the sense that
sovereign states preferred interacting with other sovereign states.
The sovereign was an identifiable party, responsible for the execution
of treaties and capable of punishing internal defectors. In contrast,
the representative bodies of the city-leagues were not sovereign and
could not negotiate credibly, nor curtail either defection or freeriding
Spruyt’s weakest point is the argument that the city-leagues
tried to have “the widest possible extension of political control over
its sphere of economic interactions.” (p. 169) In contrast,
Spruyt says that sovereign states “are delimited by explicit territorial
parameters. Although states might very well seek expansion, their
claim to authority is limited by their recognition that authority only
extends to their borders. …states are not logically predisposed
to extene their political control to other areas. Sovereignity
is based on the principle of juridical equality.” (p. 169-170)
3) Deliberate mimicry and exit, meaning that
the German lords looked at the success (in terms of reducing internal
transaction costs, providing collective goods, generating revenue,
and mobilizing resources) and decided that “sovereign, territorial statehood
was the most preferable form of organization.” (p. 172)
Although the Hansa tried to become more like a sovereign state, the member
towns increasingly defected from the league, and allied with local lords
who were “increasingly acting as sovereign, territorial rulers.”
In the final section, Spruyt applies these lessons to the Italian
city-states, a form of organization which shares characteristics from
both the city-leagues and the sovereign states.