United Nations Security Council Expansion:

The Efficacy of Small States

Under Bipolarity and Uni-Multipolarlity

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1 Introduction

Although Secretary of State Colin Powell’s presentation on Iraqi unconventional armaments in November 2002 elevated the United Nations Security Council to a pivotal role in international affairs, the subsequent debate in March 2003 revealed the Council’s inefficacy: it was not able to disarm Iraq, nor was it able to prevent unilateral American action. In recent months, the hazards of the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq have forced the United States to seek additional troop contributions from its allies, most whom require a Security Council resolution legitimating the operation. Events within the past year have revealed both the weakness of the United Nations organization and the necessary legitimating and coordinating role it plays in contemporary international relations. In short, the United Nations Security Council faces great pressure to change to meet the new challenges posed to international peace.

This pressure to reform is not new. Although reform proposals had been discussed informally since 1979, the end of the Cold War raised the Security Council to a more active and influential position. In 1990, for the first time since the Korean War, the Security Council undertook police action under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which authorizes the use of force as a last resort to “maintain and restore” international peace, and in this case, the sovereignty of Kuwait.¹ In addition, by 2002, peacekeeping operations had expanded from only 18 missions in the years prior to 1991 compared to 37 missions since, with a commensurate increase in personnel and budget. As Sutterlin (1997)² points out, the increased scope

²This paper uses a standard academic citation format [Author (Year)] for secondary literature, and a fuller citation format for primary sources, consist of news articles and press releases. Frequently, these sources are not authored, and the year alone would be insufficient to identify the specific source.
of UN peacekeeping operations has also led to increased demands for equitable representation on the Council. Finally, the opportunity seemed ripe for reform. With the United States unilaterally holding its assessment fixed at 22% of the overall budget and 25% of the peacekeeping budget since 1994, the mounting debt put the United Nations under pressure to streamline its operating methods and redistribute assessments among other states. Of particular importance, the United States and other developed countries sought to add Japan and Germany to the Security Council as permanent members in recognition of their respective roles as the second and third largest contributors to the U.N. budget. Specifically, Müller (2001) reports that in 1997, none of the five permanent members (the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China) opposed expanding the Security Council. The United States, Britain, France, and Russia all favored, at a bare minimum, the addition of Japan and Germany to alleviate their own peacekeeping and budget assessments; China did not oppose expansion of the permanent category, but favored expansion of the non-permanent category as an interim solution if no agreement could be reached on the new permanent members.

Adding Japan and Germany as permanent members, however, requires an amendment to the United Nations Charter, and Charter reform is not an easy task. Under Article 108, Charter revision is a two-stage process: first, two-thirds of the entire General Assembly must approve a resolution to amend the Charter; second, two-thirds of the member states, including the five permanent members, must ratify the amendment within the agreed-upon time frame. In the history of the organization, the Charter has only been amended once. In 1963, after the membership had expanded from the original 51 states to 112 states, the Charter was amended to expand the Security Council from 11 to 15 members, allocating five
of the ten non-permanent seats to African and Asian states, one to an Eastern European state, two to Latin American states, and two to Western European (and other) states.\textsuperscript{3}

As Müller (2001) observes, the subsequent increase from 112 states in 1963 to 185 states by 1992 seemed to merit a similar expansion. Since 1994, the General Assembly has convened an Open-ended Working Group to discuss matters related to Security Council reform. These issues are divided into two broad areas. Cluster I issues deal with reforms that require Charter amendment, such as expanding the size of the Security Council and limiting the permanent members’ veto power. Cluster II issues deal with procedural reforms that do not require Charter amendment. After three years of debate, Ismail Razali, representative from Malaysia and General Assembly president for the 1997 session, introduced a framework resolution to amend the Charter in several steps: first, the Assembly would adopt a draft framework resolution to increase the Security Council; second, the Assembly would vote for five candidates for the new permanent seats (without veto power) as follows: two from the industrialized states, and one each from the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America; third, two-thirds of the entire General Assembly would have to approve the Amendment; fourth, two-thirds of all the member states, including the five original permanent members of the Council, would have to ratify the Amendment; and finally, ten years after ratification, the United Nations would convene a review conference. The Razali plan was novel in that it did not require two-thirds approval of the entire General Assembly during the first two steps, but only two-thirds of the member states present and voting in the chamber. By circumventing Article 108 in the earliest and most problematic stages

\textsuperscript{3}During the 1963 reform vote, only one of the permanent five voted for the resolution, but they did not have the constitutional power to block reform in the General Assembly. Thus, the reform passed to the ratification stage where all five permanent members ratified it.
(agreeing to reform, and selecting the new permanent members), the Razali plan, as it was called, constituted a good-faith effort to achieve a compromise between the various positions expressed in the Working Group. It never came to a vote, however, and since 1997, a similar resolution has yet to come before the General Assembly. Although the Working Group is approaching its tenth year of deliberations, Müller (2001) notes that since 2000, the delegations have sent only junior representatives. With the recent Iraq debacle in the Council, reform is again likely to become an important issue, and understanding the conditions under which reform failed in 1997 may suggest the conditions under which reform may now succeed.

While some scholars such as Sutterlin (1997) compare the post-Cold War reform effort to the 1945 conference, comparison to the 1963 reform process is more apt. As Hoopes and Brinkley (1997) point out, the smaller states followed the lead of the four great powers that had together defeated the Axis alliance. Specifically, most of the future African and Asian states were still British and French colonies and the Latin American states followed the leadership of the United States. Although some of the middle powers, led by the Australian Foreign Minister Herbert Evatt, objected to the permanent members’ veto over collective security and Charter reform issues, they lacked the domestic support to resist the Allied powers’ demands. In contrast, the 1963 and 1997 reform efforts could not ignore the wishes of the small and medium states. Because Charter reform requires a two-thirds vote of all the member states, the permanent members, or even the minority of OECD countries, cannot expand the Security Council on their own. Thus, given the numerical majority of the small and medium states during both the 1963 and 1997 reform efforts, the success or failure of the reform requires examination of the preferences and voting behavior of these oft-overlooked
states. While the Cold War catalyzed the small states into an effective coalition for—at the very least—the crucial 1960–1963 period, the demise of bipolarity also resulted in the demise of the coalitions that had prevailed during the Cold War. Examining the lines along which these coalitions have fractured reveals that in addition to the North-South division, regional and ethnic tensions have influenced countries’ positions with respect to Security Council reform. In short, Huntington’s (1999) “clash of civilizations” hypothesis finds ample support in the United Nation’s history of Security Council reform.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines two hypotheses for the early success and later failure of reform. Section 3 reviews the historical and institutional background to the reform efforts. Specifically, while the superficial link between the expanded membership in 1963 and 1997 is obvious, most scholars ignore the fundamental realignment of state interests which both drive reform and determine its success or failure. Section 4 examines the ways in which voting patterns have changed in the General Assembly. Although a coalition of non-aligned states prevailed during the earlier reform period, this coalition lost most of its effectiveness in the years since the end of the Cold War. Section 5 concludes.

2 Hypotheses

The process of Charter reform suggests two conjoined dimensions of analysis. At the international level, states vote on the proposed amendment in the General Assembly, and the success of Charter reform depends on the ability of interested parties to build sufficiently large coalitions. At the domestic level, the relevant domestic bodies must ratify Charter reforms, with the ratifying institutions of the five permanent members having veto power
over Charter amendment.

More formally, the interaction between the international and domestic outcomes suggests two related hypotheses:

1. If states’ leaders can form a sufficiently large coalition, the reform will be voted through the General Assembly. Conversely, if coalitions fail to form, or if coalitions are insufficiently large, the reform will not pass.

2. If both the leaders and the ratifying body share preferences over outcomes, then the international outcome will be reflected at the domestic ratification stage. Conversely, if preferences differ, the domestic outcome may differ from the international outcome.

In addition, the power of the permanent five to veto amendments at the ratification stage posits the immediate hypothesis that the failure of Charter reform may simply be due to reluctance on the part of those states. While the two hypotheses above merit closer consideration, Müller’s (2001) summary of the 1997 positions and a brief review here of the positions taken in 1963 will quickly dispel the notion that the permanent five were able to shape the outcome of either reform process.

3 1963–1965: China, Colonialism, and Crisis

While some scholars, such as Sutterlin (1997), compare the last decade’s reform efforts to the 1945 San Francisco Conference, the precedent for reform is the 1963 expansion. Although United Nations delegates frequently cite the 1963 expansion as a precedent for present reform,
historians have largely neglected the institutional context which allowed reform to occur. This section remedies this gap in the historical record using contemporary news sources.

In the 1963 vote, the five permanent members (United States, Great Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and Nationalist China) did not support the reform. Indeed, of the five permanent members, only Nationalist China voted for the amendment. The United States and Great Britain abstained. France and the Soviet Union voted against the proposed amendment. Despite this opposition, however, Resolution 18/1991/A passed by a vote of 97 in favor and 11 against, with 4 abstentions.\(^4\)

Although four of the five permanent members either voted against or were neutral with respect to the actual vote, their voting behavior did not indicate that they opposed the reform proposal to the extent that they would block the amendment at the ratification stage. Brief examination of their specific voting positions shows that the permanent five voted strategically: their vote on the 1963 amendment did not reflect their true preferences with respect to the reform proposal, but were part of the larger Cold War strategic interaction. Specifically, the admission of the People’s Republic of China and European decolonization were the two issues which compelled at least three of the permanent five to vote strategically.

Of the five permanent members, Nationalist China was the least likely to vote against the resolution because it needed the support of the African and Asian states for its diplomatic survival. During the early 1960s, Taiwan recognized that it was in eminent danger of losing its U.N. seat to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While the resolution to admit the PRC had never made it out of committee during the 1950–1960 sessions, it came before the General Assembly for the first time in 1961. It was defeated by a margin of 48–37,

because the United States, reluctant to admit a large communist state in place of a nominally
democratic ally, made a deal with the Brazzaville group of Franco-African nations to seat
Mauritania in exchange for their votes.\textsuperscript{5} Observers noted, “Nationalist China— which has
to be extra careful for fear of losing its seat in the United Nations—was the only permanent
member which had voted in favor of enlarging the Security Council.”\textsuperscript{6} In short, Nationalist
China voted in favor of the Security Council reform in order to maintain favor with the
non-aligned states who had the power to eject it from the United Nations.

Although the Soviet Union was perhaps the strongest backer of reform, it voted against
the resolution because it had tied the issue of Council expansion to the issue of seating
the PRC.\textsuperscript{7} At the beginning of the 1963 session, the Soviet Union introduced a proposal to
reshuffle the geographic distribution of the six non-permanent seats on the Security Council,
signaling that it was not opposed to increasing African and Asian representation on the
Council.\textsuperscript{8} Indeed, the Soviet representative Nikolai Fedorenko went so far as to state that
his country favored a redistribution of the non-permanent seats because it “would inevitably
reduce the share of the Western countries’ seats.” The Soviet Union, however, made the
strategic decision to tie the African and Asian states’ desire for Council reform to the issue
of seating Communist China.\textsuperscript{9} Thus, while the Soviet Union favored the reform, “Moscow

16, 1961, p. 1. Indeed, when the issue to again came to vote in 1965, the vote was 47–47, with 20 abstentions.
The United States was forced to introduce a resolution requiring passage by a two-thirds vote to defeat the
November 18, 1965, p. 1.) Communist China was not seated until the 1971 session.


\textsuperscript{7}The other 10 negative votes came from the Warsaw bloc states and Mongolia, which was another Soviet
Cold War satellite state.


said it would have voted for the resolutions if the Africans and Asians had ‘joined in a
common front’ for admission of Communist China.” Indeed, immediately after the United
Nations vote, the Chinese Communists approved the expansion, and the Soviet Union was
the first of the permanent five to ratify the resolution.\(^{10}\)

Of the five permanent members, France was the most overtly concerned with its power
within the Council. Contemporary observers noted that De Gaul’s France “opposed such
a large expansion of the Security Council because this will dilute the influence of the five
permanent members.” France was unapologetic of its vote against the expansion of the
Security Council.\(^{11}\) However, from the French perspective, the expansion of the Council
would not necessarily hurt its Council power so much as it would hurt the power of the
states without colonial ties to Africa (such as the United States and Soviet Union). Indeed,
France might even expect to increase its power in the Council because the Francophone area
of Africa tended to follow France’s lead in international affairs. Thus, although France voted
against the General Assembly resolution, contemporary observers judged that France would
not “defeat the expansion in view of the fact that the states which emerged from the French
African empire are solidly in favor of the proposal.”\(^{12}\) The French Assembly unanimously
ratified the amendment.\(^{13}\)

The United States and Great Britain abstained from the 1963 vote because they had
supported an alternative proposal by the Latin American countries to expand the Security

1963, p. 5.
Council to 13 members, without a formal geographic allocation of seats.\textsuperscript{14}

At the ratification stage in 1965, the United States tied an additional issue to the expansion of the Security Council. Since 1960, both the Soviet Union and France had refused to pay assessments for the General Assembly-mandated peacekeeping operations in the Congo and on the Sinai Peninsula. By the beginning of the 1964 session, the Soviet Union’s arrears exceeded its assessments for the prior two years, and under Article 19, the Soviet Union was due to lose its vote in the General Assembly. To avoid this institutional crisis, the General Assembly held no roll call votes during the 1964 session, and adjourned during 1965. Indeed, the adjournment helped the United Nations cut down on operating costs; by January 1965, the United Nations operating on a month-to-month basis.\textsuperscript{15} Senate Republicans, recognizing that the Soviet Union favored enlargement, were determined to tie Soviet arrears to the issue of Council reform, and put off ratification until June 1965. Similarly, the French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville announced the French ratification of the reforms while warning that they would be insufficient to resolve the arrears crisis.\textsuperscript{16}

In part, the United Nations’ financial crisis was alleviated because the United States stopped pressing the Soviet Union for payment. Dean Rusk had observed that it was actually not in the interests of the United States to enforce Article 19 because the preponderance of African and Asian “have-not” states in the General Assembly could vote onerous assessments on the United States, which it would be forced to pay lest it lose its own General Assembly vote.\textsuperscript{17}

In short, the permanent members’ behavior with respect to the 1963–65 reform process showed that they were overtly aware that the African and Asian states, despite their relative economic and military weakness, held a numerical majority in the General Assembly. Voting against a reform favored by a majority of states would have severe repercussions for the resolutions they themselves favored, depending on the ability of the non-aligned states to vote in an effective coalition. The next section examines this proposition with respect to the reform period.

4 Voting Behavior Among Non-Aligned States

While several empirical studies (e.g., Alker, 1964; Marin-Bosch, 1987; Kim and Russett, 1993; and Kim and Russett, 1996) focus on voting alignments with respect to specific issues, such as decolonization or arms control, the following analysis merely asks if the non-aligned states are ceteris paribus more likely to vote together on any given issue.

4.1 The 1963 Vote

The 1963 vote to amend the Charter took place under conditions of bipolarity. In the General Assembly’s one-nation one-vote system, the non-aligned states, those states not a part of either NATO or the Warsaw bloc, formed a numerical majority. Thus, at the initial reform stage in the General Assembly, the voting patterns among the non-aligned states would determine whether or not the amendment would pass.

Under Cold War bipolarity, the voting patterns of the non-aligned states might have exhibited one of three patterns:
1. Polarization: Under pressure from both the United States and the Soviet Union, some or all of the non-aligned states could have consistently voted with one or the other of the major powers.

2. Fractionalization: Each non-aligned state could have voted with the major power who offered the most state-specific incentives.

3. Coalition-building: The non-aligned states formed a coherent, consistent voting bloc.

Of the three possible outcomes, coalition-building is the most difficult, because the non-aligned states must overcome the organizational problems associated with collective action. Under polarization, the United States and Soviet Union would play coordinating role; the small, non-aligned states could simply follow the leadership of the major power with whom they chose to align, and the major power would make sure to distribute sufficient incentives and disincentives to ensure that their block would vote as instructed. Under fractionalization, the non-aligned powers would not coordinate, but simply vote their interests. Under the coalition-building outcome, however, the non-aligned states would have to choose leaders among themselves, and these leaders would have to enforce the coalition’s positions; individual states, however, might be tempted by incentives given out by either major power and defect from the coalition’s position. Thus, the coalition-building outcome requires that the non-aligned states develop methods for keeping each other in line. Despite this enforcement problem, there is substantial anecdotal and empirical evidence that the non-aligned states were able to build a cohesive coalition and use their numerical power to extract concessions from both great powers.

By the 1963 session, the United Nations had expanded from 51 members in 1945 to 112
member states, having admitted 52 new states in the seven years between 1955 and 1963 alone. While the original 51 states had primarily hailed from Latin America and Europe, the new members were primarily from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. While the Latin American countries had historically depended on the United States to defend their interests (especially against their former European colonial masters) and had historically tended to follow the American lead, the new African and Asian states actively rejected what they viewed as neo-colonial leadership. Figure 1 shows this geographic shift as a percentage of the General Assembly for 1945 and 1963.

In addition to changing the geographic balance of the organization, these new members changed the prevailing preferences revealed through General Assembly roll call votes among

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18 United Nations Department of Public Information, Sales No. E.00.I.21.
the non-aligned countries. Beginning with the 1960 session, in particular, the geographic balance within the Afro-Asian group shifted strongly in favor of the newly decolonized African states. In particular, the African states, citing Portugal’s refusal to release her African and Asian colonial possessions, were able to muster sufficient votes to block its election to the Security Council during their first session (1960) in the General Assembly. As a contemporary observer noted,

Despite their poverty, the sheer number of the new African states will produce fundamental changes in the United Nations, ... In the General Assembly last year, it proved impossible, except on certain special occasions for the West to obtain a two-thirds majority for meaningful resolutions on “cold war” issues.

In addition to anecdotal evidence in favor of the coalition hypothesis, there is substantial empirical evidence to that effect.

4.2 General Assembly Voting Patterns: 1960–1963

During the 1960 to 1963 sessions, the General Assembly held 252 recorded roll call votes. By pairing each of the non-aligned states into unique dyads, the data contain 11,833 observations. Table 1 summarizes the number of available non-aligned dyads from the 1960 session (when 17 new African and Asian states gained voting rights in the General Assembly) through the 1963 session (when the reform vote occurred).

Gartzke and Jo (2002) construct a measure for the affinity between states’ voting positions

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The affinity index ranges from -1 (maximum disagreement) to 1 (maximum agreement), and measures the similarity in each pair of states’ portfolio of revealed preferences (the differences in their positions for all the roll call votes recorded in a given session). Thus, in a General Assembly session containing only two states and one resolution, if both states vote yes or both states vote no, their affinity index score is 1; if one votes yes while the other no, the affinity score is -1. As the number of states and the number of roll call votes increase for any given session, the affinity index can take more values on the range (-1, 1).

If the non-aligned states had formed a consistent voting block with one of the two poles, the dyadic affinity indices should have a large variance. Consider a General Assembly session with just five states, where the United States, Brazil and Micronesia formed one coalition, and the U.S.S.R. and Mongolia formed another coalition. Assume that for every roll call vote, the states vote with the respective coalitions. The resulting 10 dyadic combinations would have affinity scores as described in Table 2.

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22See Signorino and Ritter (1999) and the documentation accompanying Gartzke and Jo (2002) for a comprehensive discussion on the construction of the affinity index. Gartzke and Jo construct four measures of affinity. Of the four, this analysis employs the measure for a 3 category vote (yes, no, and abstain) without imputing values for the 1964 session (during which there were no roll call votes).
Table 2: Hypothetical 5 State, 2 Block General Assembly Affinity Scores.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dyad</th>
<th>Affinity Index</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United States–Brazil</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States–Micronesia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States–U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States–Mongolia</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil–Micronesia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil–U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil–Mongolia</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micronesia–U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Micronesia–Mongolia</td>
<td>-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.–Mongolia</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mean: -0.2
Variance: 1.07

Thus, if the non-aligned states were polarized, voting consistently with one of the two poles, the affinity scores should be highly variable because for every member in the Western bloc, the affinity score would be positive for each dyad within its bloc, but negative with respect to every member of the opposing coalition. Graphically, the interquartile range (the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile of states) should be relatively large and, if the coalitions are of a relatively equal size, the box should span both a positive and negative region, with the median voter somewhere about zero. In any case, if the non-aligned states voted consistently in the 1960–63 sessions, the affinity index scores should not exhibit a marked trend toward either concordance (upward) or discordance (downward).

In addition, if the non-aligned states were fractionalized and did not vote in consistent coalitions, the affinity scores should not show a marked pattern either toward agreement or disagreement. For example, let the hypothetical roll-call vote in Table 2 represent one vote. If a second roll-call vote resulted in a radical rearrangement (with the Soviet Union and United States voting together against Brazil, Micronesia, and Mongolia), the average
Figure 2: UN General Assembly Votes, 1960-1963 — Dyads Among Non-Aligned States

Notes: The vertical bars represent the interquartile range. The notches in the side of each bar represent the median voter and the 95% confidence interval around the median. The hinges represent 1.5 times the interquartile range, and the small dots represent outliers.

affinity score from both roll call votes would be zero. The affinity indices for each General Assembly session would depend on the underlying arrangement of state preferences, as well as the resolutions that came to vote during that session; they should not tend either upward or downward, but follow a random walk pattern.

Instead, Figure 2 shows that the preferences revealed through General Assembly roll call votes became more cohesive over the period 1960–1963. The affinity scores for the median voter (the notches in the sides of each bar) increase year on year, from 0.346 in 1960 to 0.568

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Session</th>
<th>Affinity Index Scores</th>
<th>$t$-statistic With Prior Session</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>0.346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>0.367</td>
<td>0.390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>0.443</td>
<td>0.477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>0.568</td>
<td>0.586</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In 1963. These year on year increases are significant in pair-wise comparisons of the 1960–1961, 1961–1962, and 1962–1963 sessions, with respective $t$-statistics of -4.5, -11.7, and -23.8. In addition, the vertical bars representing the interquartile range become smaller, indicating that there is less variance in the revealed preferences of a majority of the non-aligned dyads. This data is presented in Table 3.

That the non-aligned states increasingly voted together during the years prior to the first reform vote indicated that they had the numerical ability not only to sway resolutions favored by either the United States or the U.S.S.R., but also sufficient numbers to pass resolutions favored by neither great power. By the 1963 session, their numerical superiority had grown to 81 of 112 member states, or 72% of the General Assembly. Since the resolution to amend the Charter required only a two-thirds majority, the non-aligned states had more than enough votes to increase their own power and representation on the Security Council.

### 4.3 The Mid-1990s: Deceptive Concordance

Unlike the 1960s reform, the Razali plan never came to a vote in the General Assembly. Indeed, the dyadic roll call data provided by Gartzke and Jo (2002) only includes votes
through the 1996 session, one year prior to the session in which the Razali plan was under
discussion. In the absence of actual voting data, this paper attempts to impute reasons for
what voting behavior would have been like, if there had been a vote on Security Council
reform after the Cold War. This analysis proceeds in two steps: first, analysis of the available
dyadic Assembly data through 1996 may shed light on general voting patterns in the post-
Cold War environment; second, examination of state preferences revealed through General
Assembly debates may reveal how states would have voted if the proposal had reached that
stage.

At a superficial level, the General Assembly roll call vote data seem to indicate that
since the end of the Cold War, states have voted even more closely together in the General
Assembly. Figure 3 shows that the intra-group affinity scores for dyads where both states
were members of the European Union, Eastern Europe, the Organization of African Unity
(OAU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), or the Conference of Islamic States (OIC).
As before, narrower bars indicate less variance (more group discipline) and higher notches
indicate greater agreement. The European, African, less-developed, and Muslim states are
all voting alike with more consistency than they had during the Cold War. The Eastern
European states, which had been compelled to vote with the Soviet Union (and hence with
each other) throughout the Cold War, were the lone exception to this trend, but still displayed
a degree of variability and affinity within the range of the other post-Cold War groups.

However, these increasing affinity among states who belong to the same group may be
misleading for several reasons. First, the roll call votes taken during the Cold War were
on substantively different issues than those voted on during the 1990s. While Cold War
issues included arms control, decolonization, race relations, and Palestine, post-Cold War
votes notably do not include votes on decolonization, and show a preponderance toward Palestinian issues (on which the United States, Israel, and a few other states form a small but consistent voting block against the rest of the General Assembly). It may simply be that the General Assembly no longer deals with contentious, polarizing issues. Second, Figure 3 may also be misleading because the African states and the Muslim states are both subsets of the Non-Aligned Movement. Thus, if the NAM states agree on most issues, it is likely that the African and OIC states will as well. One cannot conclude from Figure 3 that the African states are voting together against the OIC states, or even that the African states are voting against the European states.
However, in the context of the specific discussion surrounding Security Council reform, it becomes clearer that states interests are increasingly being defined in cultural and geo-strategic terms. The 1997 reform failed to reach a vote specifically because a group of ten middle powers had tabled the resolution; but available public statements make it clear that even if the Razali resolution had reached a vote, it would not have passed due to opposition from the African states.

The group of 10 middle powers consisted of states that were neither major regional powers (who could expect to be candidates for new regionally-allocated permanent seats), but one of the secondary powers in their region. In addition to Italy, Canada, Egypt, Mexico, Pakistan, and Turkey, this group included Guatemala, Lebanon, Qatar, and Syria.

One of the key reasons for reforming the Security Council was to add Germany and Japan as permanent members. The German candidature, in particular, raised objections from Italy, who envied German preponderance in the European Union, and Turkey, a culturally Muslim state at the periphery of the Franco-German sphere of influence. As Müller (2001) observes, Italy in particular was vehemently opposed to a permanent membership for Germany, and instead advocated creating a pool of ten semi-permanent seats to rotate among 30 medium-sized powers. Turkey also opposed the German candidature because “adding a few members, some on the strength of their financial contribution and some on regional recognition, could not render the Council more democratic and representative,” but more elitist.\(^{23}\)

In addition, the Non-Aligned Movement had made it clear that its members would not support reform unless developing countries were added to the Council as new permanent members alongside developed Germany and Japan. One of the prime candidates for a seat

\(^{23}\)GA/9693 (December 20, 1999)
among the developing countries was India, primarily on the grounds that it was the world’s most populous democracy. Pakistan, India’s Muslim neighbor, opposed any expansion of the permanent category of membership because it feared India’s elevation to the Security Council.\textsuperscript{24}

In addition, Mexico and Canada were frequent contributors to United Nations peacekeeping missions who, as a result of their geographic proximity to the United States, had absolutely no hope of gaining permanent seats. Both Mexico and Canada advocated restricting the veto power and resisted the addition of new permanent members.\textsuperscript{25} As Paul Heinbecker, the Canadian representative put it: “Five vetoes already impaired the good functioning of the Council. How would adding five more help, and who would it help?”\textsuperscript{26} Mexico, in clear reference to the United States, further asserted that the minority of current permanent members and prospective permanent members “were willing to sacrifice the sovereign equality of states for their own aggrandizement.”\textsuperscript{27}

While the objections of this relatively small group of middle powers could be overcome, the African states posed a more serious roadblock to reform. As Roland Y. Kpotsra, the representative from Togo, observed, “About two thirds of Council deliberations affected Africa; yet, compared to other regions in the developing world, the continent was underrepresented on the Council.” In line with the recommendations of the Organization of African Unity stemming from the 1997 Ouagadougou summit, Kpotsra demanded two permanent seats (with the right of veto) for Africa on the enlarged Council. In addition, the African

\textsuperscript{24}GA/9151 (November 1, 1996)
\textsuperscript{25}GA/9824 (November 16, 2000)
\textsuperscript{26}GA/9825 (November 16, 2000)
\textsuperscript{27}GA/9824 (November 16, 2000)
states would rotate these seats among themselves.\textsuperscript{28}

The concept of rotating veto power was entirely novel, and deserves special consideration. As Kpotsra observed, two-thirds of Security Council deliberations affected Africa; he neglected to mention the reason why this was the case: most African states are without rule of law, without strong democratic institutions, chronically underdeveloped, and usually suffering some form of ethnic, civil, or interstate conflict. In short, African issues dominate the Security Council because African states are incapable of maintaining collective security over their own continent. Indeed, Freedom House reports that of the 55 African states, only five qualified as free and stable democracies in 2002. The proposal that the primarily unstable and despotic African states should receive additional representation is not only prima facie ridiculous, but stands in defiance of any sort of logic.

Consider an iterated game in which the African permanent member has a choice between condemning a fellow African state (cooperating with the rest of the Council) or vetoing the resolution (defecting from the rest of the Council). If the African leader cooperates with the rest of the Council, he knows that in a year or two when he is no longer a member of the Council, the African state he helped condemn may be on the Council, and will in turn condemn him. In this case, the despotic African leaders (50 of the 55) will prefer to defect from the rest of the Council to ensure that when he becomes subject of a Security Council resolution, his fellow African leader will in turn veto the resolution.

This situation is highly plausible given that the fifty-five African states form a highly disciplined voting group with respect to Security Council issues. For example, in contrast to the willy-nilly elections for the Latin American and Western European non-permanent seats

\textsuperscript{28}GA/9825 (November 16, 2000)
on the Council, the African states have traditionally advanced one and only one candidate for each of their available non-permanent seats.\textsuperscript{29}

With the Assembly currently at 191 states, the African states account for nearly 30% of the votes; only eight states would have to join the African states in order to block passage of any proposed reforms. Given that there were 10 medium powers opposed to expanding the Council at all, the African and middle power group had sufficient numbers to kill the 1997 Razali reform proposal.

5 Conclusion

While the 1963 reform was a product of increasing cohesion among the non-aligned states, this voting block fell apart when put to the test after the end of the Cold War. The African states and several medium powers formed an unlikely coalition to block reforms desired by the permanent five, as well as by the regional powers who aspired to become permanent members.

Despite the failure of the 1997 Razali plan, Security Council reform is no less vital today than it was ten years ago when the Working Group was established. Indeed, with the United States unwilling to accept ineffective Security Council resolutions, and increasingly willing to take unilateral or bilateral action to circumvent the United Nations altogether, the collective security organization that the Allied powers envisioned in 1945 is quickly becoming irrelevant in the post-Cold War world.

The states that have the most to lose from the collapse of collective security are precisely

\textsuperscript{29} Since 1965 (when the geographic rotation went into effect), only one African state (Nigeria) has held two terms.
those states who formed the majority of the blocking third in 1997: the African states. Unable to maintain any sort of civil order—and consequently unable to establish the strong domestic institutions that encourage trade and investment—the African states have the most to lose. As the legacy of colonial responsibility quickly falls from the memories of the current generation of Europeans, African states and peoples can no longer rely on a form of international affirmative action for past wrongs.

Future Security Council reform requires that the small states reassert their power in numbers, and vote together as they did in 1963. As long as the African states maintain their ill-defined and ill-considered demand for two rotating Council seats with the power of veto, the other small states will either make similar demands, in which case reform will again stall, or drop the issue of reform completely. Africa, like the Latin American and Asian states, should be willing to select just one of their number to become a permanent member.
References


